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THE PROCEDURE FETISH
Nicholas Bagley*
The strict procedural rules that characterize modern administrative law are
said to be necessary to sustain the fragile legitimacy of a powerful and consti-
tutionally suspect administrative state . We are likewise told that they are es-
sential to public accountability because they prevent factional interests from
capturing agencies . Yet the legitimacy-and-accountability narrative at the
heart of administrative law is both overdrawn and harmful . Procedural rules
have a role to play in preserving legitimacy and discouraging capture, but
they advance those goals more obliquely than is commonly assumed and may
exacerbate the very problems they aim to fix . This Article aims to draw into
question the administrative lawyer’s instinctive faith in procedure, to reori-
ent discussion to the trade-offs at the heart of any system designed to struc-
ture government action, and to soften resistance to a reform agenda that
would undo counterproductive procedural rules . Administrative law could
achieve more by doing less .
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law comprises a set of procedural rules that affect the
pace and composition of government action. That same government ac-
tion—whether it involves dispensing public benefits or regulating private
conduct—allocates resources, risk, and power within the United States. The
manner in which administrative law operates will thus favor some interests
over others. That’s not an indictment: any set of rules has the same charac-
ter. Increasing the stringency of judicial review for new agency regulations,
for example, will tend to aid those who have the most to lose from govern-
ment action. By the same token, curbing judicial review will help those who
stand to gain. There is no neutral, value-free way to calibrate the stringency
of judicial review, and the point holds for administrative procedure more
generally. The distribution of resources, risk, and power in the United States
is partly a function of an administrative law that is supposed to be agnostic
as to that distribution.
With increasing urgency over the past two decades, congressional Re-
publicans have advanced proposals to discipline a regulatory state that, in
their view, does too much and with too little care. These proposals travel un-
der an array of names and acronyms, but they embrace a common tactic:
they pile procedure on procedure in an effort to create a thicket so dense that
agencies will either struggle to act or give up before they start.1 The Regula-
tory Accountability Act (RAA), for example, would subject high-impact
rules to an oral hearing, complete with cross-examination and a formal rec-
ord; ban agencies from engaging in public outreach to advocate for their
rules; stitch centralized executive oversight and rigorous cost-benefit analysis
into law; impose onerous new rules on the issuance of guidance documents;
and make adherence to all of these procedures subject to judicial review.2 By
tilting the scales against agency action, Republicans hope to end “job-killing
regulations” and invigorate the free market. Not coincidentally, that means
favoring industry over environmentalists, banks over consumer advocates,
and management over labor.
The point is not that these are bad priorities. The point is that they are
political priorities. Democrats understand as much. “By hamstringing the
dedicated public servants charged with ensuring everything from safe infant
1 . See, e .g ., Regulations Endanger Democracy (RED Tape) Act of 2017, S. 56, 115th
Cong. (2017); Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act of 2017, H.R.
26, 115th Cong. (2017); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, H.R. 76, 115th Cong.
(2017).
2. Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Christo-
pher J. Walker, Essay, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629,
656–69 (2017).
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formula to clean drinking water to a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work,”
writes Sam Berger, a former official in the Obama White House, “this bill
would put corporate profits before people’s lives and livelihoods.”3 William
Funk notes that the RAA will “slow down, if not make impossible, the devel-
opment of regulations that have major effects on the economy. It does not
matter how many lives the regulation might save.”4 But the opposition from
the left presents a puzzle. If adding new administrative procedures will so
obviously advance conservative priorities, might not relaxing existing ad-
ministrative constraints advance liberal ones? What if dedicated public serv-
ants are already hamstrung? What if it already does not matter how many
lives a regulation might save?
Yet there is no Democratic version of the RAA, and little organized en-
ergy behind the idea that relaxing administrative procedures will be good for
the environment, consumers, and workers. The game is strictly defensive: to
protect administrative law, not to transform and rethink it. Actually, matters
are worse than that. Some liberals are so enchanted with administrative pro-
cedures that they are calling for more. Democrats Heidi Heitkamp and Joe
Manchin were Senate cosponsors of the RAA, arguing that it would make
regulations “smarter.”5 Cass Sunstein also supports the bill, though not
without reservation, and in so doing has thrown his support behind the im-
position of the same procedures that Republicans hope will frustrate agency
action.6 Even those who are especially sensitive to the deficiencies of modern
administrative law—Jon Michaels comes to mind—endorse court-centered
proceduralism as part of their cure.7
3. Sam Berger, Trump’s Regulatory Accountability Act Is a License to Kill, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (May 9, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/
news/2017/05/09/432129/trumps-regulatory-accountability-act-license-kill/ [https://perma.cc/
T4TK-U9GP].
4. William Funk, Requiring Formal Rulemaking Is a Thinly Veiled Attempt to Halt
Regulation, REG. REV. (May 18, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/18/funk-formal-
rulemaking-halt-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/R9YS-5D6A].
5. Press Release, U.S. Senator Rob Portman, Portman, Heitkamp Introduce the Bipar-
tisan Senate Regulatory Accountability Act (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.portman.senate.gov
/public/index.cfm/2017/4/portman-heitkamp-introduce-the-bipartisan-senate-regulatory-
accountability-act [https://perma.cc/34JM-6QVX]; Press Release, U.S. Senator Joe Manchin,
Manchin Joins Bipartisan Effort to Reduce Red Tape for Job Creators (May 24, 2013),
https://www.manchin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/manchin-joins-bipartisan-effort-
to-reduce-red-tape-for-job-creators [https://perma.cc/BEJ7-VGYM].
6 . See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 40 (2017); Cass R. Sunstein, A Regulatory Reform Bill that Everyone Should
Like, BLOOMBERG OPINION (June 22, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view
/articles/2017-06-22/a-regulatory-reform-bill-that-everyone-should-like (on file with the Mich-
igan Law Review). Richard Pierce is also sympathetic to the RAA, with the exception of the
provisions requiring formal rulemaking. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Good Effort, with One
Glaring Flaw, REG. REV. (May 8, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/08/pierce-
good-effort-glaring-flaw/ [https://perma.cc/6LYP-3JVA].
7 . See JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2017).
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Why aren’t progressives clamoring to loosen administrative law’s con-
straints? It’s not for want of targets. Administrative law is shot through with
arguably counterproductive procedural rules. In past work, for example, I
have argued that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs imposes a
drag on regulation without adequate justification;8 that the presumption in
favor of judicial review of agency action, and particularly the presumption in
favor of preenforcement review, should be reevaluated;9 and that the reflex-
ive invalidation of defective agency action is wasteful and unnecessary.10 But
the list goes on. The judicially imposed rigors of notice-and-comment rule-
making, the practice of invalidating guidance documents that are “really”
legislative rules, the Information Quality Act, the logical outgrowth doctrine,
nationwide injunctions against invalid rules—all could and perhaps should
be reconsidered.
In today’s political landscape, however, “regulatory reform” is strictly
the province of Republican policymakers, so much so that the anodyne
phrase has acquired an antiregulatory connotation. Republicans have a re-
form agenda. Democrats don’t.11 What’s more, the left’s hesitation is not a
response to Republican control of the federal government. When Democrats
held both Congress and the White House in 2009 and 2010, they didn’t press
to streamline or rethink administrative law.
Liberal quiescence can be traced, instead, to two stories about the ad-
ministrative state that have become deeply embedded in our legal culture.
Fidelity to procedures, one story runs, is essential to sustain the fragile legit-
imacy of a powerful and constitutionally suspect administrative state.12 On
the other story, procedures assure public accountability by shaping the deci-
sions of an executive branch that might otherwise be beholden to factional
8 . See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1329 (2006).
9 . See Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1336, 1339 (2014).
10 . See Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
253 (2017).
11. That may slowly be starting to change. In October 2018, three prominent adminis-
trative law scholars released an issue brief under the auspices of the American Constitution
Society with reform proposals to “make regulation more evidence-based, more transparent,
more inclusive, more accountable, and more efficient.” DANIEL A. FARBER, LISA HEINZERLING
& PETER M. SHANE, REFORMING “REGULATORY REFORM”: A PROGRESSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
AGENCY RULEMAKING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1 (2018), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Oct-2018-APA-Farber-Heinzerling-Shane-issue-brief.pdf [https://
perma.cc/78GX-G5RT]. Some of the brief’s proposals—including streamlining notice and
comment and curbing OIRA review—respond directly to the concerns addressed in this arti-
cle. Others—like requiring agencies to disclose all ex parte rulemaking contacts and “categori-
cally” treating interpretive rules as judicially reviewable—would, in my view, needlessly
frustrate agency action. But it’s a start.
12 . See infra Section II.A.1.
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interests.13 Taken together, these stories suggest we should be thankful for
the procedures we have and nervous about their elimination.
But this legitimacy-and-capture narrative is overdrawn—indeed, it is
largely a myth. Proceduralism has a role to play in preserving legitimacy and
discouraging capture, but it advances those goals more obliquely than is
commonly assumed and may exacerbate the very problems it aims to ad-
dress. In building this argument, I hope to call into question the administra-
tive lawyer’s instinctive faith in procedure, to reorient discussion to the
trade-offs at the heart of any system designed to structure government ac-
tion, and to soften resistance to the relaxation of unduly burdensome proce-
dural rules. Notwithstanding academic claims that the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) has attained a kind of quasi-constitutional status,14
administrative law remains very much an object of political contestation.
Any convention that Congress can’t tinker with the APA is quickly eroding,
if indeed any such convention ever existed. We should acknowledge that fact
even if we lament its loss.
In this, I hope to bring the practice of administrative law into conversa-
tion with a line of revisionist academic work that questions the left’s embrace
of court-centric legalism. That work, among other things, recovers how Pro-
gressive and New Deal state-builders embraced a results-oriented, nonlegal-
istic approach to administrative power. They understood—more clearly than
we do now—that strict procedural rules and vigorous judicial oversight
could be mobilized to frustrate their efforts to curb market exploitation, pro-
tect workers, and press for a fairer distribution of resources.15 “Substantial
justice,” declared President Franklin Roosevelt in vetoing a predecessor bill
to the APA, “remains a higher aim for our civilization than technical legal-
ism.”16
The left’s antiproceduralist orientation shifted in the wake of Brown v .
Board of Education, when the fight for civil rights moved into a legalistic reg-
ister—a shift that, in the revisionist telling, both narrowed the scope of the
civil rights movement’s ambitions and hampered its efforts to address yawn-
ing racial inequalities.17 Progressive reformers in the 1960s and the 1970s
13 . See infra Section II.B.1.
14 . See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017).
15 . See, e .g ., KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND
AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972 (2016); Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social
Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616 (2019);
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 733
(2016) (reviewing DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014)).
16. Harold B. Hinton, House Sustains President’s Veto of Agencies Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 1940, at 1.
17 . See, e .g ., RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1439 (2005).
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drew inspiration from the civil rights example, and adopted the tools of ad-
versarial legalism (to use Robert Kagan’s phrase)18 in an effort to spur the
vigorous enforcement of new environmental and consumer protection
laws.19 That legalism, which opponents of state action avidly supported,20 is
our inheritance from that era.21
Along the way, a positive vision of the administrative state—one in
which its legitimacy is measured not by the stringency of the constraints un-
der which it labors, but by how well it advances our collective goals—has
been shoved to the side.22 I recognize that now may not be the most auspi-
cious time to press the point, when liberals have seized on administrative law
as a means to resist the Trump Administration. But President Trump is
temporary; administrative law is not. And an administrative law oriented
around fears of a pathological presidency may itself be pathological—a cure
worse than the disease. A decade after a financial crisis roiled the financial
markets, in a century when climate change threatens environmental catas-
trophe, and in an era of growing income and wealth inequality, the wisdom
of allowing procedural rules to hobble federal agencies is very much open to
question. Administrative law may be about good governance, but it is also
about power: the power to maintain the existing state of affairs, and the
power to change it. It’s well past time for more skepticism about procedure.
18. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 9 (2001).
19 . See, e .g ., Paul Sabin, Environmental Law and the End of the New Deal Order, 33 L. &
HIST. REV. 965, 973 (2015); see also Reuel Schiller, Regulation and the Collapse of the New Deal
Order, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Market (2017), https://repository
.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2494&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma
.cc/AB4Y-T9D5].
20 . See KAGAN, supra note 18, at 50.
21 . See Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 1239, 1243–44 (2017) (“The reigning model for administrative law doctrine continues to
be external constraints on agencies imposed by Congress and the courts.”). Recent scholarship,
building on foundations laid by Jerry Mashaw, has drawn attention to “internal administrative
law,” which is to say the rules and procedures that govern agency staff and that structure inter-
actions within the executive branch. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE
OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017).
But this line of scholarship generally asks administrative lawyers to broaden their field of vi-
sion, not to rethink the existing contours of administrative law.
22 . See Kessler, supra note 15, at 733 (recalling the views of progressive reformers who
“believed that an autonomous administrative state was necessary to achieve a more just distri-
bution of the nation’s resources, and that the achievement of this political economic goal,
along with democratic support and expert guidance, were the sufficient conditions of the
state’s legitimacy”).
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I. DEFENSIVE CROUCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW23
A. Distrust
By proceduralism, I mean the full panoply of formal legal obstacles that
an agency must negotiate in order to complete a particular action. At one ex-
treme, the absence of proceduralism would imply that an agency could
structure its decisionmaking without regard to any particular rules and could
act without shouldering any kind of justificatory burden. At the other, an ex-
cess of proceduralism would require the agency to conduct every conceivable
study, ventilate every available option, engage every identifiable stakeholder,
and weather the most stringent judicial review before any of its actions,
however trivial, could take effect.
What I’m calling proceduralism is sometimes called “legalism,” partly
because the relevant procedures are imposed by law and partly because law-
yers tend to assume that procedures advance rule-of-law values.24 But I want
to resist the “legalism” label. The word smuggles into the discussion an im-
plicit judgment that the absence of a given procedure renders an agency ac-
tion less legally sound than it might have otherwise been. To make the point
concrete: if notice and comment reflects a commitment to legalism, then us-
ing a guidance document to avoid notice and comment looks like a rejection
of, and perhaps a disdain for, legalism. And so the label subtly suggests that
those who wish for fewer procedures must also not care that much about
law. Proceduralism (which may be good or bad, depending) is the more apt
term.
Crucially, a lack of proceduralism—of legally mandated procedures—
does not imply an absence of external checks on agency conduct. Congress
and the president both remain on the scene, fully capable of reforming or re-
straining agencies.25 And the bureaucracy “is itself a medium for registering
the diverse wills that make up the people’s will and for transmuting them in-
to responsible proposals for public policy.”26
An absence of proceduralism likewise does not imply anything about the
internal procedures that agencies voluntarily adopt to structure their con-
duct. Any large organization will employ procedures, both explicit and im-
plicit, to allocate responsibilities, coordinate behavior, and assure
accountability. Indeed, agencies often adhere voluntarily to procedural rules
23 . Cf . Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism,
BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016, 1:15 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-
defensive-crouch-liberal.html [https://perma.cc/P5NE-DKPZ].
24 . See generally KAGAN, supra note 18.
25 . See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION (2017); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
26. Norton E. Long, Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 808, 810
(1952).
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that are much more onerous than those imposed by law.27 As Gillian Metz-
ger and Kevin Stack have recently reminded us, these voluntary rules are the
primary constituents of “internal administrative law,” and they can at times
frustrate action in much the same way as externally imposed rules.28 But
agency-adopted procedures are matters of discretion: they can be reconsid-
ered, adjusted, overhauled, or scrapped if they impede agency action without
adequate justification. Not so with traditional strictures of administrative
law, which apply whether the agency believes they serve a useful purpose or
not.
Equally crucially, nothing in my argument implies that legally mandated
procedures do not yield benefits. They do. But they can also seriously impair
the vigor with which an agency pursues its assigned mission. Selecting the
type and quantity of procedures to impose on agencies is an optimization
problem: Which set of procedures will best balance the competing goals of
efficiency, the protection of legal rights, and public accountability? It’s easier
to state that problem than to solve it. For one thing, we don’t all agree on
what the right balance should be. For another, we lack good evidence about
how most administrative procedures affect that balance. Without either
agreement or evidence, administrative law has been shaped by a crude and
contested assessment of the costs and benefits of vigorous governmental ac-
tion.
What informs that assessment? The stories we tell ourselves about the
state. That’s why it matters so much that administrative law has been built
on a bedrock of distrust. When it was adopted in 1946, the APA aimed to
soothe the jangled nerves of legal and business communities alarmed by the
New Deal and the muscular wartime exercise of state power.29 Discipline
would come through the imposition of procedures to channel, improve, and
restrain agency action. Agencies that engaged in formal adjudication would
have to adhere to trial-type procedures.30 Agencies that adopted rules would
have to offer notice and an opportunity to comment.31 Congress also left un-
disturbed the Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v . Chenery, which required
agencies to offer reasons for acting from the time of decision, not those de-
vised at some later date.32 To assure fidelity to these procedural rules and
27. Elizabeth Magill, Foreword, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 860
(2009) (describing how agencies “voluntarily constrain their discretion” and “limit their proce-
dural freedom by committing to afford additional procedures, such as hearings, notices, and
appeals, that are not required by any source of authority”).
28. Metzger & Stack, supra note 21, at 1248.
29 . See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558–61 (1996).
30 . See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–557 (2012).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
32. 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
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protect against irrational action, all final agency action was, by default, sub-
jected to judicial review.33
On the page, the APA’s procedural strictures were spare. They were not
to remain so. Liberal lawyers in the 1960s and 1970s, many of them products
of the Vietnam era, grew increasingly disenchanted with the idea that agen-
cies could act as disinterested experts.34 They likewise grew attuned to the
risk of agency capture,35 and came to believe that judicial participation in the
agency process was necessary both to further congressional intent36 and to
protect individual rights.37 At the vanguard were newly formed public inter-
est groups staffed by idealistic young lawyers who had been inspired by the
courtroom successes of the civil rights movement.38 Their heroes were not
the New Dealers who labored in agency trenches, but crusaders like Ralph
Nader and Rachel Carson who held the government to account.39
By the 1970s, Congress had adopted a rash of new laws to regulate au-
tomobiles, air and water quality, workplace safety, and more.40 Naturally,
“political conservatives feared that the bureaucrats might be too zealous,
hostile to business and economic growth,” so they made common cause with
political liberals, fighting with them “for legislative provisions that restricted
administrative discretion and subjected it to legal challenge.”41 As the courts
began to read novel obligations into the spare language of the APA, the pro-
cedural net was drawn tighter still. No longer could agencies offer bare no-
tice of the “subjects and issues” involved in a rulemaking.42 They were
expected to be granular about what they meant to do and to disclose all the
evidence that they meant to draw on.43 No longer could agencies privately
mull the comments they received or finalize a rule with a “concise general
statement of [its] basis and purpose.”44 They were instead to respond public-
ly to all vital comments—or, rather, to all comments that a reviewing court
33. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
34 . See Sabin, supra note 19, at 979 (quoting Judge Friendly as saying in 1962 that agen-
cies “did not combine the celerity of Mercury, the wisdom of Minerva, and purity of Diana to
quite the extent we had been taught to expect”); Schiller, supra note 19, at 18–19 (“In a political
culture that increasingly emphasized the value of participatory democracy and individual liber-
ty, the administrative state was viewed with suspicion.”).
35 . See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1039, 1043 (1997).
36 . See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stat-
ing that “the court and agency are in a kind of partnership relationship for the purpose of ef-
fectuating the legislative mandate”).
37 . See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597–98 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
38 . See Sabin, supra note 19, at 991–92.
39 . See id . at 983, 991–92.
40. KAGAN, supra note 18, at 47.
41 . Id . at 50.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012).
43 . See United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
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might later deem vital.45 And if an agency’s final rule departed too far from
the proposal, it would have to start all over again to avoid the rule’s invalida-
tion on “logical outgrowth” grounds.46
By 1971, Judge Bazelon could herald “a new era in the history of the long
and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts,”
one in which courts would “insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative
action.”47 (The equation of “strict judicial scrutiny” with “fruitful collabora-
tion” was emblematic of the times.) Rules about standing were relaxed.48
Statutes precluding judicial review were read into oblivion.49 Guidance doc-
uments were scrutinized to see if they had binding effect and, if so, were in-
validated for failing to pass through notice and comment.50 In Abbott
Laboratories v . Gardner, the Supreme Court brushed aside finality and ripe-
ness concerns to endorse preenforcement review of agency rules.51 The
courts subjected compliance with the National Environmental Protection
Act (NEPA) to judicial review, “ma[king] adversarial legalism a recurrent
feature of governmental efforts to build highways and license power plants,
implement forestry plans, dredge harbors, construct waste disposal facilities,
and issue offshore oil exploration leases.”52 By the time the Supreme Court
recognized in Vermont Yankee that proceduralism had run amok in the low-
er courts,53 all of these changes and more were firmly embedded in adminis-
trative law.
45 . See, e .g ., Nat’l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass’n, Inc. v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 40
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
46 . See Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A]n agen-
cy’s proposed rule and its final rule may differ only insofar as the latter is a ‘logical outgrowth’
of the former.” (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1992))).
47. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (“[T]he court must con-
sider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment.”).
48 . See, e .g ., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686–87 (1973); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Re-
form, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 38 n.172 (2011).
49 . See, e .g ., Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974).
50 . See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
51. 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967).
52. Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 32 n.100 (1994). After NEPA’s enactment in 1969, the federal courts ini-
tially divided over whether courts could review the substance of an agency’s environmental
impact statement. Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments—1972, 1973 DUKE L.J.
157, 301–10. The courts eventually resolved that split by opting for hard-look review. See
SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984).
53. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543–
45 (1978).
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Strict judicial oversight of agencies was accompanied by a surge of con-
gressional interest in transparency tools. First adopted in 196654 and sub-
stantially amended in 1974,55 the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requires agencies to disclose their records upon request and subjects any re-
fusal to do so to judicial review. The Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA), adopted in 1972, imposes strict transparency rules on advisory
committees,56 and the Government in the Sunshine Act (GITSA), adopted in
1974, opens every meeting of more than two members of regulatory com-
missions to public observation.57
With support from Congress, the executive branch then stepped into the
game. In 1980, the Paperwork Reduction Act required agencies to justify any
effort to collect information from the public and established the Office of In-
formation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to assure compliance.58 Shortly
after taking office, President Reagan tapped OIRA with responsibility for re-
straining agencies that were heedless of the costs they were imposing on
American industry. By executive order, no major agency rule could take ef-
fect without OIRA’s sign-off, which would be forthcoming only after a thor-
ough-going review of costs and benefits.59 (Independent agencies were
exempted.60) Because OIRA’s gatekeeping role stymied agency decisionmak-
ing—indeed, that was the point—many observers expected President Clin-
ton to rescind the order upon taking office.61 But an institutional device to
promote consistency with White House priorities was too tempting to aban-
don. President Clinton made OIRA review his own, and OIRA review—
gatekeeper function and all—has become an entrenched feature of the regu-
latory state.62
When Republicans swept Congress in 1994, they quickly adopted, with
President Clinton’s support, a number of new procedural rules to constrain
agencies. The Congressional Review Act imposes a sixty-day waiting period
on the effective date of any major rule, requires agencies to submit a raft of
information to Congress about new rules, and adopts fast-track procedures
54. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012
& Supp. 2018)).
55. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
56. Pub. L. No. 92–463, § 10, 86 Stat. 770, 774–75 (1972).
57. Pub. L. No. 94–409, § 3, 90 Stat. 1241, 1241–46 (1976) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552b (2012)).
58. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, § 2, 94 Stat. 2812, 2819–21
(1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3507 (2012)).
59. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
60 . See id . § 1(d).
61. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1995) (describing Clinton’s continuation of OIRA’s oversight as “in many ways quite
surprising” in light of the criticism Reagan’s program had received).
62 . See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 8, at 1262.
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to afford Congress a chance to halt new rules.63 The Unfunded Mandates Re-
form Act requires agencies to engage in intergovernmental consultation be-
fore adopting any rule that might impose financial burdens on state, local,
and tribal governments, and to publish the results of that consultation.64 The
Regulatory Flexibility Act compels agencies to specifically account for the
burdens that their rules may place on small businesses, exposing that analy-
sis to judicial review.65 And the Information Quality Act, designed to address
the ostensible scourge of “bad science,” requires agencies to create a formal
mechanism for responding to petitions (usually from industry) asking for
the correction of information that doesn’t adhere to OIRA guidelines on da-
ta quality.66
The consistent pattern is that procedure after procedure is adopted to
soothe an ever-present (indeed, ever-increasing) anxiety about the state. The
sediment deposited by this accretion of procedures can channel agency ac-
tion into unproductive courses or even dam it altogether.67 There’s an analo-
gy here to complaints about how government rules stifle industry. No
regulation, taken alone, is especially objectionable, but the sum total frus-
trates action.
The difference between agency-enfeebling proceduralism and job-killing
regulations, however, is that only the latter is a matter of urgent public and
bipartisan concern. When President Trump issued an executive order in the
first month of his presidency requiring every agency to withdraw two old
rules before adopting any new one,68 it wasn’t surprising to see him employ
familiar conservative rhetoric: “This executive order is one of many ways
we’re going to get real results when it comes to removing job-killing regula-
tions . . . .”69 But the Obama Administration sang much the same tune: one
of its signature regulatory initiatives was a retrospective review to identify
rules “that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burden-
63. Pub. L. 104-121, §§ 251–53, 110 Stat. 847, 868–74 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 801–808 (2012)).
64. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
65. Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 241–45, 110 Stat. 847, 864–68 (1996) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012)).
66. Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. C, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153 to -154 (2000) (codi-
fied at 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note (2012)).
67 . See Kagan, supra note 52, at 5 (“[C]ompared to European democracies, regulatory
decision making in the United States entails many more legal formalities—public notice and
comment, open hearings, restrictions on ex parte and other informal contacts, high evidentiary
and scientific standards, mandatory official ‘findings’ and responses to interest group argu-
ments—most of which are designed to enhance interest group participation and review by
courts.”).
68. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 3 C.F.R. 284 (2018), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 249
(Supp. 2018).
69. Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Execu-
tive Order on Regulatory Reform (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-order-regulatory-reform
[https://perma.cc/Y8MR-SVVE].
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some, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with
what has been learned.”70 Complaints about overzealous regulation are taken
seriously in the political culture. Fears that procedural rules may hamper
agency action are not.71
They’re not nonexistent, of course. Jerry Mashaw, for example, has writ-
ten plaintively that the “use of law to defeat law-making may ultimately un-
dermine administrative law itself,” and that “legal technicality will eventually
come to be seen as the enemy of effective governance.”72 Tom McGarity has
been beating the drum for decades about agency ossification.73 Peter Strauss
worries that administrative law has not developed “means of encouraging
attention and responsibility without imposing debilitating costs.”74 Shep
Melnick has done yeoman’s work exploding various platitudes about judicial
review.75 Alan Morrison, Lisa Heinzerling, and Rena Steinzor have all raised
alarms about OIRA.76 And so on.
But voices decrying the costs of administrative law’s proceduralism are
marginal, absent entirely from the political conversation and relegated to the
sidelines of the academic debate.77 There is zero public pressure to eliminate
preenforcement review, to curtail hard-look review, to repeal the regulatory
reform bills of the 1990s, to rethink the rigor of notice-and-comment rule-
making, or anything of the sort. The field of modernizing administrative law
has been ceded to those—on both the left and the right—who distrust the
state.78
70. Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app.
at 817 (2012); Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Af-
fairs, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (June 14, 2011), https://www.
foreffectivegov.org/sites/default/files/regs/oira14june.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM7V-Y26C].
71 . See KAGAN, supra note 18, at 220 (“[T]he same politicians who are disturbed when
their programs are bogged down by litigation rarely take a public stand against legal rights to
challenge national bureaucracies in court.”).
72. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the
Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 420 (1996).
73 . See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
74. Peter L. Strauss, Speech, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American
Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 775 (1996).
75 . See R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR
ACT (1983).
76 . See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325 (2014);
Alan B. Morrison, Commentary, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way
to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062–63 (1986); Rena Steinzor, The Case for
Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209
(2012).
77 . See infra text accompanying notes 90–96, 180–183.
78 . See Kagan, supra note 52, at 26–27.
358 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:345
B. The Neutrality Myth
Why have progressives abandoned the field? One answer—a deficient
one, in my view—is that there is no problem to solve. Administrative law’s
procedural rules are formally neutral: they constrain, yes, but they constrain
alike agencies that wish to do conservative things and those that wish to do
liberal things. The key text here is Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the
United States, Inc . v . State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co ., where
the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the APA exposes deregulatory
measures to less scrutiny than agency actions imposing affirmative obliga-
tions.79 State Farm’s evenhandedness—its insistence that “the forces of
change do not always or necessarily point in the direction of deregula-
tion”80—gives the impression that administrative law’s procedural burdens
may, on net, have no partisan valence at all. The canonical cases taught in
every administrative law course reinforce that view. Some cases skew con-
servative: think of FDA v . Brown & Williamson, which rejected FDA’s at-
tempt to regulate cigarette marketing,81 or FCC v . Fox Television Stations,
which upheld penalties imposed on broadcasters for airing “fleeting exple-
tives.”82 But others skew liberal. The lesson of Overton Park is that adminis-
trative law preserves public parks;83 State Farm, that administrative law
improves auto safety;84 and Massachusetts v . EPA, that administrative law
protects the environment.85 Win some, lose some.
Far from accepting agency inaction as some natural baseline, the APA
even defines “agency action” to include a “failure to act.”86 And, in Massa-
chusetts v . EPA, the Supreme Court held that an agency’s refusal to adopt a
rule is “susceptible to judicial review” and sternly rebuked EPA for its refusal
even to say whether greenhouse gases contributed to climate change.87
Agencies that decline to act for partisan reasons, or those that are simply
sunk in torpor, have as much to fear from the courts as those agencies that
regulate with abandon—so the story goes.
The same for OIRA. When originally established under President
Reagan, OIRA advanced the deregulatory agenda of its political masters. But
President Clinton’s embrace of centralized oversight suggested that a de-
79. 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983); see also Merrick Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review,
98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 543 (1985).
80 . State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42.
81. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
82. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
83 . See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 406 (1971).
84 . See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 34.
85 . See 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012); see also Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial
Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 461–62 (2008)
(“[T]here is no fundamental difference between judicial review of agency inaction or action
under the APA.”).
87 . See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527–28, 533–35.
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regulatory bent is a contingent feature of the institution, one that waxes and
wanes with the sitting administration’s political priorities. Where President
Reagan wanted to minimize costs, President Clinton wanted to maximize
benefits net of costs.88 His revised executive order also addressed the
Reagan-era problem of interminable delay by imposing a ninety-day limit on
review.89 And so OIRA, once an implacable foe of regulation, was domesti-
cated. Still operating a quarter-century later under the Clinton executive or-
der, OIRA has become a seemingly permanent and largely uncontroversial
fixture of the administrative state.
Similar stories about administrative law’s evenhandedness can be (and
have been) told about other aspects of proceduralism.90 And so the political
neutrality of administrative law has hardened into something of an article of
faith.91 Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, two of the deans of the field, can
thus write that “administrative law lacks any kind of ideological valence” and
“is organized not by any kind of politicized master principle but by com-
mitments to fidelity to governing statutes, procedural regularity, and nonar-
bitrary decisionmaking.”92 They concede that “there is a sense in which
administrative law does have libertarian features, certainly insofar as it ena-
bles regulated entities to challenge the legality of agency action.”93 But they
88. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 638–39 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802 (2012).
89 . Id . § 6(b)(2)(B).
90 . See William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law
Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699, 706 (1979) (“The hard look doctrine plays no favorites;
it is advanced as enthusiastically by industry as it is by environmentalists. Its acceptance is
deep.” (footnote omitted)).
91. Recent empirical work suggesting that ossification isn’t so bad reinforces that view.
Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee counted the number of regulations that federal
agencies have issued over several decades. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Admin-
istrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-Making “Ossified”?, 20 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261 (2009); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing
the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed,
1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414 (2012). Because the number of regulations is large and
the pace of their issuance relatively brisk, they say that their findings “disconfirm” the ossifica-
tion hypothesis. Yackee & Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance,
supra at 262. But that’s not right. As Richard Pierce has argued, concerns about ossification
typically center on economically significant rulemaking, not the everyday rules that are the
focus of the Yackees’ study. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to
Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1497–98 (2012). In addition, the
number of regulations issued is a poor proxy for their strength. To cope with procedural obsta-
cles and litigation threats, agencies may adopt many weak regulations instead of a few stiffer
ones. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1396–99 (2010). In any event, changing technology and the world’s increasing
complexity both suggest that the number of regulations ought to increase over time. Ossifica-
tion may thus have reduced the number of regulations relative to a nonossified baseline, even if
the overall number remained stable over the four-decade period of the study.
92. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 393, 401–02 (2015).
93 . Id . at 464.
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deny that the APA and the doctrinal apparatus that comes along with it can
be counted as libertarian “in any general or systematic way,” invoking,
among other things, the principle from State Farm that deregulatory actions
are subject to judicial review.94 They argue that administrative law instead
reflects a compromise:
The political, social, and economic forces that swirl around the administra-
tive state—not only the APA but also the legalism of the organized bar, the
technocratic and economic approaches to regulatory policymaking, and the
demands for democratic oversight by elected officials and for democratic
participation by affected groups and citizens—have produced a set of rules
that in effect reconcile and calibrate these crosscutting considerations. It is
inconsistent with that basic settlement to select one of the APA’s multiple
commitments and elevate it as the master principle that should animate
administrative law.95
Sunstein and Vermeule’s argument works at the level of justification.
Administrative law is indeed defended with reference to broadly shared
commitments, not to contested ideological visions. But their argument
breaks down at the level of substance. Even compromises justified in neutral
terms can have controversial political consequences. Such is the case with
administrative law, which has an identifiably libertarian, anti-statist tilt. That
shouldn’t come as a surprise. A body of law founded on distrust of the state
naturally serves to restrain the state—an arrangement that, on net, is more
congenial to a libertarian agenda than a progressive one.96 The surprise, if
there is one, is that progressives don’t seem to mind that the deck is stacked
against them.
C. Administrative Law’s Status Quo Bias
As a general matter, any legally mandated procedure raises the costs of
agency action. Instead of devoting their limited resources to those tasks that
they believe will best advance their legislatively assigned mission, agencies
must attend to procedural obligations that they might otherwise have dis-
pensed with. The costs associated with any given procedure may be small,
94 . Id . at 465.
95 . Id . at 466–67.
96. A word about terminology. Classical libertarianism doesn’t reflexively reject the
need for government. It expects, for example, that the state will enforce rules of property, con-
tract, and tort in order to facilitate a market economy and demarcate a zone of freedom for
individual choice. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, at ix (1974). For the
same reasons, classical libertarians could conceivably support state action to forestall harms
arising from externalities, at least where private bargaining is infeasible: no one should be at
liberty to infringe on the property rights of another. In administrative law, however, modern
American libertarianism has taken on a more specific connotation, one resting on the view that
“political distortions yield policies that depart unjustifiably, and harmfully, from the baselines
set by market ordering. These policies violate liberty, properly understood, and also threaten to
reduce social welfare.” Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 92, at 398. It is that reflexively anti-
statist version of “libertarianism” that I mean to employ.
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even trivial; the requirement to publish rules in the Federal Register, for ex-
ample, is not onerous.97 But most procedural obligations are not so easily
satisfied. They require substantial attention from agency staff, which means
the diversion of attention from other priorities. And procedures are cumula-
tive. Those that appear reasonable in isolation can, when piled together, take
a serious toll on agency efficiency.98
Apart from increasing costs, adhering to procedures also delays agency
action. That’s obviously true in a narrow sense: every task takes time. But the
problem runs deeper, as Herbert Simon’s work on organizational deci-
sionmaking suggests. Any agency must juggle a host of competing priorities,
which means employees and political appointees with managerial responsi-
bilities tend to oversee multiple projects. But complying with legally man-
dated procedures requires the time and attention of those harried federal
managers, creating organizational bottlenecks.99 The problem is exacerbated
because government agencies tend to have too few staff to carry out their
many responsibilities. And so even a minor procedural hurdle can become a
source of delay, and multiple procedural rules can introduce multiple bottle-
necks.
Delay then affords groups opposed to agency action more time to mobi-
lize against it. They can lobby Congress, the White House, and the agency
itself, whether by mustering coalitions to support their cause, channeling fi-
nancial contributions to key political officials, or threatening to withhold
support for future initiatives.100 As delays mount, changes in the political
weather—the replacement of key political appointees, a midterm election
that changes the odds of congressional oversight, the election of a new presi-
dent—give those groups yet another opportunity to thwart agency action. In
agencies as in legislatures, limited bandwidth and the need to sustain politi-
cal capital means that, for any reasonably complex action, the window of op-
portunity will open only briefly. Delay allows that window to be shut before
the agency can act.
Procedural rules can also empower gatekeepers to stop agency action
dead in its tracks. Courts are the most obvious example. For salient actions
with sizable economic consequences, judicial review has become, in effect,
the final step in the agency process. And the risk of losing in court is real:
empirical research indicates that about one in three challenges to agency ac-
97 . See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
98 . See McGarity, supra note 73. For a vivid visual illustration of the point, consider the
almost comical complexity of the “Reg Map” of informal rulemaking, which was developed
under the auspices of the General Services Administration. ICF CONSULTING, THE REG MAP:
INFORMAL RULEMAKING (2003), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/reginfo/Regmap/regmap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4GJ-UWSE].
99 . See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 241 (4th ed. 1997).
100 . See BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC
USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 4–5 (1978).
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tion succeeds on some ground or another.101 In all of those cases, the agency
must either respond to the court’s concerns, with the attendant resource di-
version that entails, or abandon the action altogether. Either way, judicial
review systematically depletes agency resources and frustrates agency ac-
tion.102
The uncertainty of judicial review also works against agencies that seek
to make the most sensible use of their resources. On the margin, rational
agencies will shy away from actions that are likely to provoke litigation103
(or, alternatively, soften those actions to mitigate litigation risk104), meaning
that they will squander some of the best opportunities to achieve collective
goals. And when they do act, they will invest in fortifying their action from
potential judicial challenge, whether or not that’s an especially good use of
their time.105 Courts thus distort agency judgment even when they don’t re-
view a thing.
And courts are not the only gatekeepers. OIRA is another. No significant
proposed rule, final rule, or guidance document can issue from an agency
unless and until OIRA approves it.106 Depending on the year, that means
that about four dozen employees107 working within the Executive Office of
the President are responsible for reviewing anywhere between 415 and 831
significant agency actions.108 The risk of bottlenecks is acute; indeed, OIRA
is notorious for sitting on rules. Lisa Heinzerling reports that “[m]any, many
rules linger at OIRA long past the 90- or 120-day deadline” by which it is
supposed to complete its review.109 “Some rules have been at OIRA for
years.”110 Even when OIRA adheres to its deadlines, it tacks on many months
to the effective date of agency action. Sunstein, in a meditation on his time as
OIRA administrator under President Obama, argues that what looks like
unwarranted delay from the outside usually reflects, from the inside, “a
101. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 173 (2010).
102. For a discussion of the costs of remand, see Bagley, supra note 10, at 263–65.
103 . See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 290 (1989).
104 . See Wagner, supra note 91, at 1396–99.
105 . See R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 245, 247 (1992) (arguing that agencies “react[] defensively” to judicial review).
106. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 8, 3 C.F.R. 648–49 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U .S .C . § 601 app. at 806 (2012); Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, to Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2009/m09-13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GTK8-4RPA] (clarifying that “significant policy and guidance documents . . .
remain subject to OIRA’s review under Executive Order 12866”).
107 . See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs:
Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1845 (2013).
108. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN
OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL
REGISTER 10 tbl.3 (2016).
109. Heinzerling, supra note 76, at 358.
110 . Id . (emphasis omitted).
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judgment that important aspects require continuing substantive discus-
sion.”111 Whatever the value of that substantive discussion, however, it still
amounts to delay. Even more significantly, OIRA is almost exclusively a re-
active institution, one with the power to reject agency action but little capaci-
ty to spur it.112 Agencies that wish to do something important have reason to
fear OIRA. Agencies that sit on their hands do not.
In short, proceduralism drains agency resources, introduces delay, and
thwarts agency action.113 To that extent, it puts a thumb on the scale in favor
of the status quo;114 by itself, that’s enough to give administrative law a liber-
tarian, anti-statist cast. Nonetheless, the ideological valence of administrative
law remains at least arguably ambiguous. Proceduralism might impede a
progressive agenda that depends on active government, but what if it equally
thwarts a libertarian agenda to pare back the existing state?115 If that were the
case, administrative law’s apparent asymmetry would be an artifact of
whichever baseline (more government, less government) you happened to
prefer. Which is to say, it wouldn’t be an asymmetry at all.
Without question, administrative law can entrench Democratic
achievements.116 In the early years of the Trump Administration, for exam-
ple, the courts have repeatedly rebuked federal agencies for suspending
111. Sunstein, supra note 107, at 1842.
112 . See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 8, at 1274, 1277. OIRA could potentially be re-
shaped to advance a more proactive agenda. Mike Livermore and Ricky Revesz, for example,
have offered a sustained argument for a review mechanism that exploits “information generat-
ed by private actors to identify areas where action is needed but where agencies have failed to
move forward.” Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1383 (2013).
113 . See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Re-
view, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 803 (2006).
114 . See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 180, 181 (1999).
115. In a related vein, Aaron Nielson has argued that the agency procedures that produce
ossification may, under some conditions, empower agencies to achieve long-term goals. Aaron
L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85 (2018). But those conditions are strict.
They arise only when (1) an agency offers regulated parties alternative ways to comply with a
given rule; (2) one of those alternatives requires substantial up-front investment and the other
doesn’t; and (3) the agency prefers the investment-heavy approach to the alternative. See id . at
120–23. In those cases, a “sticky regulation”—one that’s hard to withdraw—may serve as a
commitment device that encourages regulated parties to make the agency-preferred invest-
ments. Id . at 123–24. Such cases, however, are likely the exception, not the rule. And it’s odd to
claim that procedures empower agencies to achieve the things they really care about, but only
when they don’t care enough about those things to adopt a binding rule demanding them.
116. Indeed, McNollgast have argued that the APA sailed through Congress precisely
because, “by 1946, the New Dealers in Congress had an interest in consolidating their policy
gains against the possible antipathy of a Republican presidency, and they could finally count
on the courts to favor New Deal programs in adjudicating procedural provisions.” McNollgast,
supra note 114, at 183.
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Obama-era rules without observing procedural niceties.117 For any number
of reasons, however, administrative proceduralism makes it easier to tear
down the administrative state than to build it up. On net and over time, pro-
ceduralism favors a libertarian agenda over a progressive one.
D. Administrative Law’s Ideological Asymmetry
Because the world is changing at a breakneck clip, a bias toward inaction
means that the state will respond too slowly as new risks present themselves
and existing risks come into focus. Internet commerce, drones, social media,
cellular phones, algorithmic trading, driverless cars, and artificial intelligence
barely existed two decades ago; today, they are part (or are becoming part) of
the fabric of our lives. We only dimly understand how to cope with the at-
tendant risks to health, welfare, and privacy associated with these technolog-
ical changes. At the same time, older risks have become more prominent,
whether because of evolving scientific understanding (climate change, the
waning efficacy of antibiotics), shifting patterns of industrial organization
(the rise of monopoly power across multiple industries), or crises that ex-
posed fragility in complex systems (the financial crisis, Hurricane Maria). An
administrative apparatus that cannot adapt to a changing world threatens to
become a relic of a bygone era. It also becomes easier to dismantle. Regula-
tions adopted in a very different environment will come to look ill fitting and
unresponsive to modern problems. Justifying their abandonment or relaxa-
tion is straightforward: the world really has changed.118 Adopting a new rule
and defending it against concerted attack, however, remains enormously dif-
ficult.
More prosaically, the outsize participation of industry groups in notice
and comment means that agencies will have a wealth of information at their
disposal about the costs of agency rules and why, given certain facts about
the industry, they won’t accomplish very much. As Tom McGarity and Ruth
Ruttenberg have shown, “industry cost estimates have usually been high,
sometimes by orders of magnitude, when compared to actual costs in-
curred.”119 In contrast, regulatory beneficiaries often lack the resources, the
technical know-how, and the industry-specific knowledge to contradict
those estimates, leaving agencies to do the best they can with the information
they have.120 An agency that lowballs cost estimates or is too bullish about a
rule’s benefits will face the ire of industry, which will (with some reason) ar-
117 . See, e .g ., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d 95
(2d Cir. 2018); Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
118. Wendy Wagner and her coauthors have recently documented that agencies fre-
quently amend their rules, typically at the behest of regulated parties and “with the diffuse pub-
lic potentially on the losing end of the stick.” Wendy Wagner et al., Dynamic Rulemaking, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 241 (2017).
119. Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2002).
120 . See id .
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gue in court that the agency has downplayed their concerns without ade-
quate justification. In contrast, an agency that wishes to kill a rule or justify
its refusal to move forward can cherry-pick from the data submitted by in-
dustry, all with little to fear from courts that are reluctant to second-guess
agencies on technical matters.
Standing doctrine exacerbates the imbalance. In contrast to regulated
entities, which will face a concrete injury in fact arising from compliance
costs, a regulatory beneficiary’s interest in a given rule may be too diffuse
and insubstantial to count.121 In Public Citizen v . NHTSA, for one example
among many, a public interest group representing drivers challenged a
NHTSA standard on the ground that it was insufficiently stringent.122 The
D.C. Circuit dismissed the case: in the court’s view, the statistical increase in
risk associated with the rule’s alleged weakness was too speculative and in-
substantial to amount to an injury in fact.123 Indeed, the Article III difficul-
ties for regulatory beneficiaries may increase in coming years: The author of
Public Citizen, then-Judge Kavanaugh, indicated his discomfort with “prob-
abilistic injury.”124 With his elevation, a Supreme Court that is already hawk-
ish on beneficiary standing may become more hawkish still.
The progressive promise of State Farm is stillborn for yet another rea-
son. If they are to be followed, rules must sometimes be enforced—which
means agencies must be prepared to convince not only an administrative law
judge but also the courts that the action is reasonable and legal. In contrast,
under Heckler v . Chaney, an agency has no justificatory burden when it de-
clines to enforce a statute.125 Agencies can thus gut existing rules by enforc-
ing them less vigorously—without observing any procedural niceties at all.126
121 . See Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of Imposing a Standing
Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391, 393–94 (2009).
122. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 F.3d 234, 238–41
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279,
1293, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (raising doubts about standing based on increased statistical risk
and asking for more evidence of petitioner’s standing); see also Food & Water Watch, Inc. v.
Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that “this Court has limited its jurisdiction
over cases alleging the possibility of increased-risk-of-harm to those where the plaintiff can
show ‘both (i) a substantially increased risk of harm and (ii) a substantial probability of harm
with that increase taken into account’ ” (quoting Public Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1295)).
123 . Public Citizen, 513 F.3d at 235–37. A group representing regulatory beneficiaries
can’t overcome the standing hurdle by arguing that it’s likely that one of its members will suf-
fer an injury: “At the very least,” the D.C. Circuit has held, “the identity of the party suffering
an injury in fact must be firmly established.” Am. Chemistry Council v. Dep’t of Transp., 468
F.3d 810, 820 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
124 . Public Citizen, 489 F.3d at 1295.
125. 470 U.S. 821 (1985); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After
Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 683 (1985) (“Whatever the defects of judicial review,
they do not justify a one-way ratchet against regulation . . . .”).
126 . Cf . Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Salazar, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011)
(“Ample precedent demonstrates that a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief is
moot when the challenged [guidance document] is withdrawn.”).
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On occasion, the courts will rebuke agencies for adopting categorical nonen-
forcement policies,127 but agencies face virtually no litigation risk if they
don’t publicly codify those policies (and little risk even if they do).128 Less
obviously but no less importantly, Lincoln v . Vigil precludes review of agency
decisions to allocate agency resources away from enforcement.129 During the
Trump Administration, for example, EPA enforcement actions against pol-
luters dropped precipitously130 and, prior to Administrator Scott Pruitt’s res-
ignation, special agents charged with investigating environmental crimes
were reassigned to his security detail.131 There’s nothing the courts can do
about any of that.
Nor does Massachusetts v . EPA redeem Heckler of its deregulatory bi-
as.132 Even as it held that the courts can review an agency’s decision to de-
cline to adopt a rule, the Supreme Court intimated that an agency should be
able to justify a refusal to regulate by invoking resource constraints or timing
concerns.133 Because such constraints and concerns are ubiquitous in the
administrative state, agencies have at hand a ready-made justification for
turning away virtually any rulemaking petition. The same cannot be said for
agency decisions to adopt a rule in the first instance.
Consider too the weakness of the Supreme Court’s remedy in Massachu-
setts. Notwithstanding its stirring language, the opinion’s only immediate
legal effect was to vacate EPA’s denial of Massachusetts’s rulemaking peti-
tion. The Court didn’t order EPA to grant the petition; indeed, it couldn’t
have done so. As the Supreme Court confirmed in Norton v . Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, courts can force agencies to act “only where a plaintiff
127 . See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 166 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally di-
vided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam); Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(finding an FDA nonenforcement policy to be inconsistent with statute); Crowley Caribbean
Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 676–77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between a “single-
shot non-enforcement decision” and a “general enforcement policy” for purposes of judicial
review (emphasis omitted)).
128 . See Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1571, 1573 (2016) (“[I]nstitutional limitations on courts—limitations with a broader res-
onance in constitutional and administrative law doctrines—provide a cogent descriptive and
normative justification for judicial deference to executive nonenforcement.”).
129. 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) (“The allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation
is another administrative decision traditionally regarded as committed to agency discretion.”).
130 . See Eric Lipton & Danielle Ivory, Under Trump, E .P .A . Has Slowed Actions Against
Polluters, and Put Limits on Enforcement Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/us/politics/pollution-epa-regulations.html [https://per
ma.cc/U4YS-FAKD].
131 . See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, At EPA, Guarding the Chief Pulls Agents from
Pursuing Environmental Crimes, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/national/health-science/at-epa-guarding-the-chief-pulls-agents-from-pursuing-environ
mental-crimes/2017/09/19/7b7b8b6c-9ce0-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html [https://per
ma.cc/TQV7-VEL2].
132 . See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007).
133 . See id . at 527, 533 (suggesting that EPA could avoid taking action “if it provides
some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion”).
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asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required
to take.”134 While EPA was obliged to respond in writing to Massachusetts’s
petition, it had no deadline for doing so.135 Unsurprisingly, the Bush-era
EPA ran out the clock, without objection from the courts.136 What was true
for EPA is true for agencies in general. If they do not wish to do something,
the courts cannot and generally will not order them to do it (absent a con-
crete statutory deadline). Failing to act thus presents minimal legal risk,
where acting exposes the agency to legal challenge—even after Massachu-
setts.137
The problem is not limited to judicial review. Although OIRA is nomi-
nally evenhanded—it reviews any “significant regulatory action,” which is
defined to be any action with an effect of $100 million or more on the econ-
omy138—Ricky Revesz and I have argued that its reactiveness, its abiding
concern with regulatory burdens, and its lack of attention to agency inaction
mean that the institution is biased toward deregulation.139 What’s more,
OIRA review casts a disquietingly long shadow: risk-averse agencies “will be
sorely tempted to craft regulations that may not maximize net benefits but
will nevertheless avoid unwelcome attention from OIRA.”140
Compounding the problem, OIRA and the courts both police the adop-
tion of guidance documents, but not their withdrawal. Because guidance
documents elaborate on agency rules and policies, they tend to restrict the
freedom that entities have in complying with those rules and policies. (Guid-
ance can also have the opposite effect: it can clarify that regulated entities en-
joy discretion that they were uncertain they had. The overall tendency,
however, is toward specification and control.141) Early in the Obama Admin-
istration, OIRA clarified that “significant policy and guidance documents . . .
134. 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2012).
136 . See Darren Samuelsohn & Robin Bravender, EPA Releases Bush-Era Endangerment
Document, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2009), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/
2009/10/13/13greenwire-epa-releases-bush-era-endangerment-document-47439.html
[https://perma.cc/DRA4-FDVX] (recounting how political officials within the Bush Admin-
istration squelched an EPA proposal to act in response to the decision).
137. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule discern in the case law three constraints on
agency discretion to decline to act. First, agencies can’t miss hard deadlines; second, they can’t
ignore congressional instructions to act; and third, they can’t use delay to abdicate their statu-
tory responsibilities. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When
Agencies Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157, 176–88 (2014). What’s notable is how weak these
constraints are. Most agency action is not subject to statutory deadlines or even a formal con-
gressional mandate. And, “[b]ecause of the difficulties in administering the [anti-abdication]
principle, it will usually amount to a judicially underenforced constraint . . . .” Id . at 162.
138. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 8, 3 C.F.R. 648–49 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app.
at 806 (2012).
139. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 8, at 1270.
140 . Id .
141 . See generally NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, FEDERAL AGENCY GUIDANCE: AN
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2017).
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remain subject to OIRA’s review.”142 But oversight of guidance is “more lim-
ited and unsystematic” than oversight of rules,143 and an agency’s elimina-
tion of a guidance document is subject to no review at all. Similarly, the
courts will invalidate policy statements for failing to pass through notice and
comment when they impose a “binding norm” from which the agency is not
free to depart,144 and courts will likewise invalidate interpretive rules when
they deviate too far from the statute or regulation that they’re interpreting.145
Only under rare circumstances, however, will the withdrawal of a guidance
document yield litigation.146 Again, the asymmetry is plain.
Finally, and perhaps of greatest moment, administrative law is fond of
imposing judicially enforceable procedural rules on agencies to facilitate the
ability of outside groups to influence agency decisionmaking, to monitor
agency activities, and to check agency overreach. Some examples include no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking, FOIA requests, and hard-look review,
though there are many others. But taking advantage of these participatory
opportunities is costly: it demands time, resources, and expertise. The impli-
cation is that facially neutral procedural rules can give well-organized, well-
financed groups—in particular, those that represent business interests—a
distinct participatory advantage.147 Under some conditions, that participa-
tory advantage can magnify industry’s ability to influence outcomes on the
administrative state. And, as a general matter, industry’s goal when it comes
to administrative action is not subtle—it wants less of it.148 I’ll return to the
point later in arguing that procedures that are sold as defenses to agency cap-
ture often end up making it worse. For now, the crucial point is that admin-
istrative law’s formal neutrality may afford groups with an antiregulatory
agenda disproportionate influence over agency decisionmaking.
* * *
In short, proceduralism does not just favor the status quo, though it does
that. It also systematically favors inaction over action, deregulation over reg-
142. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 106.
143. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1755, 1785 (2013).
144. Am. Bus Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
145 . See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
146 . Cf . Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Salazar, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011) (de-
scribing that declaratory relief is only granted when “the facts alleged, under all the circum-
stances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment”
(quoting Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1985))).
147 . See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
148 . See generally Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business?
Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U .S . Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 135 (2006).
December 2019] The Procedure Fetish 369
ulation, and nonenforcement over enforcement. The end result is a distinc-
tively libertarian slant to administrative law.
II. PROCEDURALISM’S ALLURE
If that’s right, liberals’ reluctance to rethink administrative law’s em-
brace of proceduralism is difficult to understand. Part of the explanation, I
think, is that the legal community has internalized two stories about the ad-
ministrative state that make it difficult to contradict the assertion that a giv-
en procedure is essential. The first story is about legitimacy: robust
procedures, we are told, are needed to legitimize an administrative state that
rests on a precarious constitutional foundation and that the public views
with suspicion. The second is about accountability: that proceduralism, by
stitching the public into agency decisionmaking, can guard against the risk
that influential minorities will wield undue influence over agency action.
In my view, these two stories are corrosive to sensible discussion of the
trade-offs that administrative law inevitably entails. When concrete argu-
ments in favor of or against a given procedure have run their course, gauzy
claims about legitimacy and accountability serve as ready-made arguments
in its defense. Our small-c conservative legal culture takes those claims very
seriously, especially when it comes to existing procedures. No one can prove
that relaxing procedural constraints won’t damage the legitimacy of the ad-
ministrative state. No one can prove that agency capture won’t come roaring
back. Why roll the dice?
We should stop being so afraid. The legitimacy-and-accountability
claims that have proliferated in the literature are, with rare exceptions, too
abstract and analytically muddled to be useful. Yes, some procedures may
conduce to legitimacy; others may prevent capture or foster accountability.
But procedures can also undermine legitimacy and frustrate accountability.
Instead of assuming that a given procedure serves the public-regarding goals
that it’s said to serve, administrative lawyers should start from a position of
skepticism.
The point may seem banal. It is not. The rhetoric of legitimacy is itself
constitutive of the legitimacy crisis that procedures are supposed to address.
By the same token, the reflexive assertion that agencies have an accountabil-
ity deficit reinforces the view that agencies are corrupt incubators of private
influence. By embracing these stories, progressives play into the hands of
those who would prefer to strangle the state. The administrative state is not
illegitimate; it is not the handmaiden of private interests. We should stop
suggesting otherwise.
A. Legitimacy
1. The Rhetoric of Legitimacy
Anxiety about agency legitimacy is reflexively invoked to defend admin-
istrative law’s proceduralism. Richard Stewart, for one example among hun-
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dreds, notes that “[t]he traditional conception of administrative law . . . be-
speak[s] a common social value in legitimating, through controlling rules
and procedures, the exercise of power over private interests by officials not
otherwise formally accountable.”149 Bruce Ackerman, for another, insists
that, “[w]hatever the weaknesses of the [APA] . . . the statute recognizes that
regulatory decisionmaking needs special forms of legitimation that enhance
popular participation, provide ongoing tests for bureaucratic claims of
knowledge, and encourage serious normative reflection upon the policy
choices inevitably concealed in abstract statutory guidelines.”150 Gillian
Metzger speaks of the way that the APA’s procedural constraints are “credit-
ed with broadly legitimizing administrative governance.”151 And on and
on.152
Legitimacy claims are especially prominent in the literature about notice
and comment.153 “An agency’s public proposal of a rule and acceptance of
public comment prior to issuing the final rule,” writes Nina Mendelson, “can
help us view the agency decision as democratic and thus essentially self-
legitimating.”154 That’s why Lisa Schultz Bressman has called for a presump-
tion in favor of rulemaking: “[A]llowing agencies to use interpretive rules
and guidance documents . . . while improving efficiency in particular in-
stances, comes at too high a price overall. It jeopardizes administrative legit-
imacy. If we are to succeed in legitimizing the administrative state, we
cannot prioritize efficiency above all else.”155 Note her assumption that we
have not yet succeeded, and may never succeed, in legitimizing the adminis-
trative state. In a similar vein, consider Jody Freeman, who argues that agen-
cy use of guidance documents “threaten[s] to further undermine the
legitimacy of the rules produced by removing even the pretense of public ac-
cess and participation.”156 Not just undermine—“further undermine.” Pre-
sumptively illegitimate to begin with, agency policymaking must be cleansed
149. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1670–71 (1975).
150. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 697 (2000).
151. Metzger, supra note 14, at 62.
152 . See, e .g ., Miriam Seifter, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63
UCLA L. REV. 1300, 1302 (2016) (noting that “courts and commentators celebrate participa-
tion as a crucial way to help legitimate the administrative state and improve agency deci-
sions”); Mila Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923,
935 (2016) (arguing that each of administrative law’s procedural rules “plays a dual role: it con-
strains administrative action in various ways and, as a result, it legitimates that action”).
153 . See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 904 (2004)
(calling the claim that notice and comment legitimates agency action “familiar”).
154. Nina A. Mendelson, Foreword, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2011).
155. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 546 (2003).
156. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 10 (1997).
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through obeisance to legally mandated procedures. The fact that agencies of-
ten seek extensive input on guidance documents is irrelevant. We have
lapsed; we must atone.
I’m picking on prominent people in the field, none of whom are political
conservatives and many of whom have worked for Democratic administra-
tions. But the claim is ubiquitous, and other procedures are defended in the
same register.157 Take judicial review. Louis Jaffe famously argued that “[t]he
availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if
not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legit-
imate, or legally valid.”158 Ronald Levin says that, “[b]y helping maintain
public confidence that government officials remain subject to the rule of law,
judicial review also bolsters the legitimacy of agency action.”159 That claim is
repeated ad nauseam by courts160 and commentators.161
Legitimacy has become an all-purpose justification to defend all manner
of proceduralism. But what does it even mean? Too often, legitimacy is little
more than shorthand for the judgment that it’s always best to be procedural-
ly scrupulous. That’s less an argument than a signal of discomfort with the
disorderliness of policymaking in an administrative state that is more com-
plex, improvisational, and downright strange than we sometimes like to
acknowledge.162 But we can do better, even if most commentators do not. In
general, invocations of agency legitimacy sound in one of two different regis-
ters: legal or sociological.163
157 . See, e .g ., Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 13 (2013) (“Cost-benefit analysis
helps alleviate . . . concerns [about legitimacy and democratic accountability] by making agen-
cy decisionmaking more transparent to the public and to elected officials who can exercise
control over the agencies.”); Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST.
L.J. 237, 242 (2014) (formal rulemaking can improve “the quality and perceived legitimacy” of
some agency rules).
158. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320, 372 (1965)
(“The Administrative Procedure Act has . . . the merit of codifying the presumption of review-
ability.”).
159. Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN.
L. REV. 689, 742 (1990).
160 . See, e .g ., Saylor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 723 F.2d 581, 582 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The legit-
imacy of an adjudication by an administrative agency depends to a great extent on the availa-
bility of effective judicial review.”).
161 . See, e .g ., Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal
Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 811;
Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: A
Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997).
162 . See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137 (2014); Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the
Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841 (2014).
163 . Cf . Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1842 (2005) (distinguishing between legal, sociological, and moral legitimacy).
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2. Legal Legitimacy
Here’s the standard story: Agencies house executive, legislative, and ju-
dicial functions under one roof, in apparent contravention of the lawmaking
process described in the Constitution. They thus evade the checks and bal-
ances that are supposed to channel federal power. Agencies are also said to
labor under an acute democratic deficit: they lack the populist pedigree of
either the legislature or the president, yet they wield immense government
power. Against this backdrop, proceduralism serves as a rough substitute for
the deliberation and accountability that attend conventional lawmaking.
Although procedural fastidiousness won’t allay the concerns of those who
are already convinced that the administrative state is unconstitutional,164 it
may mitigate the concerns of the rest of us who recognize that the adminis-
trative state is here to stay.
It’s almost impossible to overstate how entrenched this perspective has
become. To judge from the casebooks, students are barely introduced to the
administrative state before they are told of its enduring “tension” with the
constitutional separation of powers.165 Endless law review pages have been
devoted to defending the view that separation-of-powers principles inspire
or even compel various aspects of administrative law.166 The warnings in the
case law are dark: Chief Justice Roberts, in deploring the rise of federal agen-
cies, is apt to quote James Madison for the view that the “accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”167 The lesson is clear: the
164 . See, e .g ., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (“The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its
validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless . . . revolution.” (foot-
note omitted)).
165. LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN ET AL., THE REGULATORY STATE 4-8 (2d ed. 2013) (sug-
gesting the tenuous constitutional status of agencies in a constitutional system that “rest[s] on
a fundamental mistrust of consolidated power”); STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 46 (8th ed. 2017) (“The question addressed in this chapter is
how the combination of functions characteristic of modern administrative agencies can be rec-
onciled with the structural principles embodied in the Constitution.”); JOHN F. MANNING &
MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 334–51 (2d ed. 2013) (opening
their discussion of federal agencies by noting how “[t]his confluence of rulemaking, enforce-
ment, and adjudication under the roof of a given agency would appear problematic under a
strict view of the separation of powers”); PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 217, 777–86 (12th ed. 2018) (“These combinations of functions and
broad delegations . . . create enduring tensions between the constitutional framework and
modern administrative government.”).
166 . See, e .g ., Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 484 (2010); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Founda-
tions of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look:
Judicial Activism and Administrative Law, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 53 (1984).
167. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)); see also Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (“The growth of the Ex-
ecutive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life,
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modern administrative state is a regrettable symptom of constitutional de-
cay.
It’s no wonder that this dim view of agencies finds ready acceptance
among modern conservatives, with their commitment to a limited federal
government and their suspicion of state power. But the separation-of-powers
anxiety is nearly as prevalent among progressives who share neither that
commitment nor that suspicion.168 Jon Michaels has in recent years offered
the most fulsome exploration of the separation-of-powers anxiety and its
connection to administrative law. For Michaels, the genius of the separation
of powers is how it “gives voice and venue to any number of important but
conflicting values and provides procedures and pathways for those values to
collectively inform American public law and governance.”169 Agencies
threaten to upset that scheme, which means that, while “most of us have
made our peace” with agencies, “it remains an uneasy, awkward peace, par-
ticularly for those troubled by the fact that the separation of powers . . .
seemingly fell by the wayside.”170 Michaels’s recent book is a plangent explo-
ration of how the administrative state can be redeemed of its original sin.
Among his proposals? An insistence that agencies adhere to strict procedural
rules and that courts assiduously enforce compliance with them—what he
calls “judicial custodianism.”171
The religious language—Michaels speaks of “redeeming” agencies, of the
“virtuous” division of powers within an agency, of the “restoration” of the
administrative state, of the “sacred” obligations of those vested with state
power172—is reminiscent of rhetoric on the right that laments the rise of the
administrative state and calls for a “restoration, a second coming of the Con-
stitution of liberty.”173 This is the separation-of-powers liturgy. It resonates
in a legal culture in thrall to originalism,174 and it both constitutes and rein-
forces what has now hardened into a core precept of administrative law: that
the modern state is a fall from grace.
It is long past time to retire this line of reasoning. James Freedman not-
ed almost a half century ago that anxiety about the “the place and function of
the administrative process in American government” has been with us from
heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the
people.”).
168 . See MICHAELS, supra note 7, at 8 (“Contemporary scholars, even those . . . generally
friendly to progressive government regulation, continue to underscore how much ‘we have
struggled to describe our regulatory government as the legitimate child of constitutional de-
mocracy.’ ” (quoting Bressman, supra note 155, at 462)).
169 . Id . at 6.
170 . Id . at 8.
171 . Id . at 179–201.
172 . Id . at 16, 20, 40, 58.
173. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION, no. 1, 1995, at 83, 84
(book review).
174 . See William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2373
(2015).
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the outset, yielding an “enduring sense of crisis historically associated with
the administrative agencies.”175 But a crisis that endures is not a crisis; it is
the steady state. Agencies have wielded legislative, executive, and judicial
powers from the beginning of the Republic.176 Their proliferation was essen-
tial to the prosecution of two world wars,177 to the rise of the post–New Deal
welfare state,178 and to the regulation of novel risks ranging from automobile
safety to industrial pollution.179 Measured against any theory of constitu-
tional interpretation to which liberals claim fealty—whether that’s common
law constitutionalism,180 settlement through historical practice,181 or the liq-
uidation of constitutional principles182—the administrative state’s undimin-
ished persistence stands as a convincing refutation of the view that it’s
somehow constitutionally suspect. There must be an expiration date for wor-
rying about the fundamental consistency of the administrative state with our
constitutional structure. Surely that date has passed.
Even the originalist case for the unconstitutionality of the modern ad-
ministrative state is forced.183 Early Americans may not have anticipated a
federal government like the one we have, but it doesn’t follow that the Con-
stitution prohibits Congress from creating one. Not only is that difficult to
square with Founding-era practice—again, agencies have been with us from
the First Congress—but it runs counter to the original public meaning of a
text that broadly empowers Congress to adopt “all Laws which shall be nec-
essary and proper for carrying into Execution” its assigned powers.184 Noth-
ing in the Constitution purports to limit Congress’s authority to delegate to
agencies, unconvincing efforts to read such a limit into Article I’s vesting
175. James O. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1041, 1043 (1975).
176 . See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION
(2012); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE (1996).
177 . See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Foreword, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1343, 1390 (2014).
178 . See TANI, supra note 15, at 90.
179 . See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 125
(1981); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 172 (1990).
180 . See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
181 . See NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (“[T]his Court has treated practice
as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject
to dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era.”); Curtis A. Bradley &
Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 421
(2012).
182 . See generally William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019)
(describing and “rediscover[ing] the concept of constitutional liquidation”).
183 . See Metzger, supra note 14, at 42–46 (so arguing).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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clause notwithstanding.185 Nor do such delegations contravene the Constitu-
tion’s scheme for dividing power among the branches.186 Those delegations
are in fact enacted pursuant to that scheme when they pass through both
houses of Congress and are signed by the president.187 Under black-letter
law, they present no separation-of-powers concerns whatsoever. As Justice
Scalia explained for the Supreme Court in City of Arlington v . FCC:
Agencies make rules (“Private cattle may be grazed on public lands X, Y,
and Z subject to certain conditions”) and conduct adjudications (“This
rancher’s grazing permit is revoked for violation of the conditions”) and
have done so since the beginning of the Republic. These activities take “leg-
islative” and “judicial” forms, but they are exercises of—indeed, under our
constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the “executive Pow-
er.”188
To read into the spare text of the Constitution some kind of distaste for fed-
eral agencies—because they wield “too much” power, because they blend
functions, or because they’re too insulated from the public will—is the sort
of constitutional adventurism that principled originalists are supposed to es-
chew.189
185 . See, e .g ., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1729 (2002) (“[T]he Article I Vesting Clause . . . simply does not speak
to the point at issue.”).
186 . See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1939, 1944 (2011) (“[T]he Constitution adopts no freestanding principle of separation of
powers.” (emphasis omitted)).
187 . See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 596 (1984) (“[A]s a textual and interpretational
matter, the separation-of-powers model need and probably should be taken no further than its
use for understanding the interrelationships of the three named actors (Congress, President,
Court) at the very pinnacle of government.”).
188. 569 U.S. 290, 304 n.4 (2013).
189. Indeed, there’s a better originalist case for the unconstitutionality of arbitrariness
review than there is for the unconstitutionality of federal agencies. Until the late nineteenth
century, appellate-style judicial review of executive branch decisions was commonly thought to
be unconstitutional. JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY 20 (2018) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s position was that an appeal to the judiciary
from an administrative determination would be unconstitutional.”); Bagley, supra note 9, at
1295 (“The federal courts were troubled at the prospect of the judicial revision of discretionary
decisions of the executive branch, much as the Supreme Court in Hayburn’s Case worried
about the constitutionality of executive branch review of final judicial determinations.” (foot-
notes omitted)). Rooted in the separation of powers, the notion was that each branch of gov-
ernment must have final say over questions within its domain. Consider Marbury v . Madison,
where Chief Justice Marshall wrote that it was “scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all
pretensions” to “enquir[ing] how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which
they have a discretion.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). The appellate model of judicial re-
view of agency action was stitched into administrative law only in the early years of the twenti-
eth century. See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 942 (2011). But no
one’s clamoring to dismantle hard-look review on originalist grounds.
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It’s true, of course, that some of the same functional considerations that
animate the separation of powers also animate some pockets of administra-
tive law. Judicial review of the legality of agency action, for example, allows
courts to check agencies that exceed boundaries demarked by Congress.190
Rules requiring agencies to separate adjudicatory functions from prosecuto-
rial and investigative functions mimic the separation of powers among the
branches.191 Civil service protections constrain the president’s ability to bend
agencies to his will, which may prevent Congress’s voice from getting lost in
agency hallways.192 And appropriations law requires the executive branch to
annually solicit Congress for funding, which helps to protect its lawmaking
functions.193
All of this echoes the separation of powers. But none of it is constitu-
tionally compelled. Depending on the felt needs of the time, Congress can
and does adjust the division of powers across the branches and within agen-
cies. For example, the legislature routinely prohibits judicial review of politi-
cally sensitive or highly technical agency actions.194 The APA violates a strict
separation of functions by assigning to the head of an agency both prosecu-
torial and adjudicatory powers.195 The number of political appointees rela-
tive to civil servants has swelled over the past five decades, increasing the
functional authority of the president to control the bureaucracy and aug-
menting the Senate’s role in confirmations.196 And not every agency needs
an annual appropriation: some are empowered to fund their activities out of
exactions imposed on regulated firms, limiting their year-to-year reliance on
Congress (and the White House, which makes budget requests).197
The point is not to defend any particular deviation from administrative
law orthodoxy. The point, instead, is that the Constitution’s separation of
powers has no legal bearing on the separation of agency functions. As a mat-
190. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 704 (2012) (creating a default rule subjecting final agency action to
judicial review).
191 . See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012); see also Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1655–56 (2016) (detailing other aspects of the independence of ad-
ministrative law judges).
192. 5 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012) (defining the “competitive service”); 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2012)
(detailing “[p]rohibited personnel practices”).
193. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2012) (making it a crime to spend money in excess of “an
amount available in an appropriation”).
194 . See Bagley, supra note 9, at 1325–27 (discussing Congress’s practice of attending to
the availability of judicial review).
195 . See S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 57 (1941) (“[Agency heads] have at least residual powers to
control, supervise, and direct all the activities of the agency, including the various preliminary
and deciding phases of the process of disposing of particular cases.”).
196 . See PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE
DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 7 (1995) (documenting a 430% increase in the number of po-
litical appointees and senior executives between 1960 and 1992).
197 . See generally Christopher C. DeMuth, Sr. & Michael S. Greve, Agency Finance in the
Age of Executive Government, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 555 (2017) (cataloging atypical financing
schemes for federal agencies).
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ter of institutional design, the risks of amalgamated powers sometimes coun-
sel in favor of their separation.198 But sometimes the costs of separation out-
weigh the benefits, and where that’s the case, blending powers within an
agency offends nothing in the separation of powers.199
Legitimacy arguments that turn on agencies’ perceived democratic defi-
cits are similarly misplaced. Agencies are themselves the products of a dem-
ocratic process, one in which Congress and the president have jointly
resolved that delegating to an agency is the best way to serve the public inter-
est. Even if the goal is partly to insulate agency decisions from the vicissi-
tudes of plebiscitary politics, that’s a democratic choice—and in many cases,
a perfectly reasonable one. Public accountability does not mean that agencies
must respond like tuning forks to every change in public attitudes, nor does
it mean that they must adopt every policy that an unreflective public might
endorse. It just means that agencies must be the product of our collective will
and subject to our collective control. And they are: what Congress can make,
Congress can unmake.
Nor is it even obvious that agencies are less democratic than Congress.
Agencies can of course exploit slack in their relationships with their political
overseers to pursue their own ends. But so too can the national legislature.
Congress’s pathologies—chief among them its sensitivity to factional inter-
ests and its embrace of destructive tit-for-tat partisan politics, but the list
goes on—mean that legislators routinely ignore or minimize the interests of
the broad American public.200 Agency bureaucrats, in contrast, are subject to
supervision by a president accountable to a national constituency;201 have a
professional orientation that attunes them to the public interest;202 and are
selected from a more broadly representative pool than politicians.203 “If one
rejects the view that election is the sine qua non of representation,” political
scientist Norton Long argued in 1952, “the bureaucracy now has a very real
claim to be considered much more representative of the American people in
its composition than . . . Congress.”204 Jerry Mashaw makes much the same
198 . Cf . Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality,
122 YALE L.J. 384, 389 (2012) (arguing that the principle that no one should be a judge in his
own case “amounts to little more than a banal counsel that impartiality is sometimes an im-
portant value in institutional design”).
199. An independent adjudicator may be necessary to satisfy due process concerns, but
that’s a different matter. See Strauss, supra note 187, at 596–97 (separating “individuals’ needs
for protection from political intervention in particular cases” from “any general theory about
place in government; the former can be provided without necessary regard for the latter”).
200 . Cf . Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and
Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419 (2015).
201 . See generally KAGAN, supra note 18.
202 . See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
203 . See Sahil Chinoy & Jessia Ma, Opinion, How Every Member Got to Congress, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/26/opinion/sunday/
paths-to-congress.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
204. Long, supra note 26, at 814.
378 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:345
point: agencies’ obligations to explain and defend their decisions with refer-
ence to goals that command broad public assent may give them a democratic
edge over an often-dysfunctional Congress.205 One need not crown a victor
in some contest of democratic fidelity to appreciate that agencies may not
labor under much of a democratic deficit, much less a deficit that calls into
doubt their constitutional or legal legitimacy.
Which is why nothing is gained—and much is lost—by defending pro-
ceduralism in a constitutional register. It’s alluring to believe that scrupulous
adherence to procedure can somehow cure the administrative state’s pur-
ported constitutional sins. But it can’t. Constitutional law is generally hostile
to second-best solutions.206 If the administrative state really is constitutional-
ly defective, the only way to restore the balance—to bring the prodigal Con-
stitution home—is to undo the whole damn thing.207 Because that’s
unthinkable, the legal legitimacy of the administrative state can never—will
never—be secure. In the meantime, any procedure that slows, checks, and
constrains agencies will be constitutionally virtuous precisely because it hob-
bles them. And no matter how many more procedures you add, they will
never, ever be enough. It’s a sucker’s game, and we should stop playing it.
3. Sociological Legitimacy
Apart from legal legitimacy, commentators are fond of invoking con-
cerns with sociological legitimacy. The worry here isn’t that federal agencies
are legally questionable, but that their authority may be so compromised and
tenuous that they are unworthy of public respect. A dearth of sociological
legitimacy might manifest as a lack of voluntary compliance with an agency’s
commands;208 as a poor reputation, perhaps associated with the belief that
the agency is corrupt, venal, or incompetent;209 or as a loss of faith in collec-
205 . See MASHAW, supra note 189, at 177; see also Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep
State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1655 (2018) (“[F]ar from being shadowy or elitist, the
American bureaucracy is very much a demotic institution, demographically diverse, highly
accountable, and lacking financial incentives or caste proclivities to subvert popular will . . . .”).
206 . See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010)
(“[T]he ‘fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution,’
for ‘[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of demo-
cratic government.’ ” (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986))).
207 . See Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Essay, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 966 (2018) (“Rhetorically, [originalist] arguments have contributed to
a narrative of constitutional corruption that authorizes, and maybe even requires, bold moves
to recover a prelapsarian past.”).
208 . See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (2006) (“[N]ormative commit-
ment through legitimacy means obeying a law because one feels that the authority enforcing
the law has the right to dictate behavior.”).
209 . See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 46 (2010) (“Whatever the aim of the organiza-
tion, its performative reputation expresses its audiences’ varying judgments of the quality of the
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tive action, up to and including the view that the agency lacks the moral au-
thority to command.210 In contrast to legal legitimacy, which is almost exclu-
sively the domain of lawyers, sociological legitimacy’s audience is much
broader. It includes those subject to the agency’s commands, those whose
interests the agency protects, and the public at large.
An agency’s legal and sociological legitimacy (or lack thereof) can rein-
force one another. Sociological legitimacy turns in part on whether lawyers
avow that it is legally legitimate, at least to the extent that the broader public
cares what lawyers think. That’s one reason that the rhetoric of the constitu-
tional fall from grace matters: as Gillian Metzger has argued, “[e]ven kept to
a vocal minority . . . constitutional attacks can have an outsized effect by
sowing doubts about administrative legitimacy and thereby limiting the pro-
gressive potential of—and public support for—administrative government in
the future.”211 Similarly, an agency’s widespread public acceptance tends to
deflate objections to an agency’s legal legitimacy.
A lack of specification about the sort of legitimacy we’re talking about—
legal or sociological—means that claims about legitimacy tend to slide from
one register to the other, lending legitimacy arguments a certain slipperiness.
Once the argument is pinned down, however, it’s apparent that there’s no
necessary connection between an agency’s sociological legitimacy and its ad-
herence to legally mandated procedures. Legitimacy is not solely—not even
primarily—a product of proceduralism. Legitimacy arises more generally
from the perception that an agency is capable, informed, prompt, responsive,
and fair. (Abbe Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell, and Rosa Po have called at-
tention to “the legitimacy of government getting its work done.”212) Mandato-
ry procedures may sometimes advance those values. They can focus agencies
on priorities they may have ignored,213 orient agencies to broader public
goals,214 and improve the quality of agency deliberations.215 But procedural-
ism can also channel agency resources into senseless paperwork,216 empower
entity’s decision making and its capacity for effectively achieving its ends and announced ob-
jectives.”).
210 . See Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the
Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2463 (2017) (referring to “sociological and pub-
lic legitimacy” as “the ambient sense in the polity that, whatever grievous errors or injustices
the administrative state may inflict in particular instances, its basic existence is acceptable, and
the errors and injustices are jurisdictionally valid”).
211. Metzger, supra note 14, at 5.
212 . See Gluck et al., supra note 162, at 1842.
213 . See TAYLOR, supra note 52 (documenting how the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 spurred agencies to take environmental concerns seriously).
214 . See Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing Regulation, Digitally, DEMOCRACY (Fall 2014),
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/34/democratizing-regulation-digitally/
[https://perma.cc/HL2G-6PWJ] (analogizing the information acquired through notice-and-
comment rulemaking to the information acquired from the Hayekian price signal).
215 . See MASHAW, supra note 189, at 196–97.
216 . See Bagley, supra note 9, at 1288.
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lawyers at the expense of substantive experts,217 and frustrate agencies’ abil-
ity to achieve their goals.218 When proceduralism impairs an agency’s ability
to do its job, the overall effect on agency legitimacy is ambiguous.219
What’s more, if an agency consistently makes bad decisions, the lawyer’s
assumption that more procedures will force it to make good ones is quite
dubious. Bad decisions may sometimes arise because the agency didn’t fol-
low the proper procedures, but they’re more often the product of resource
constraints, poor leadership, substantive legal rules, organizational dysfunc-
tion, ill-trained employees, political infighting, and the like. In general, the
best way to build an agency’s legitimacy will be to address those concerns,
either by turning to Congress for resources and reform, or by enlisting
someone who knows something about management. Yet lawyers, not man-
agers, have assumed primary responsibility for shaping administrative law in
the United States.220 And if all you’ve got is a lawyer, everything looks like a
procedural problem.
The point is worth dwelling on. By international standards, lawyers oc-
cupy an unusually central role in the United States. That’s been true from the
beginning: “It is at the bar or the bench that the American aristocracy is
found,” Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in the 1830s.221 Nearly two centuries on,
lawyers still stand athwart the American state. They make up less than 1% of
the population, but more than one-third of the membership of the 116th
House of Representatives.222 Four out of the last ten presidents were lawyers
(President Johnson briefly attended law school but did not graduate).223 And
every federal judge is, naturally, a lawyer. As Dan Ernst has recently docu-
mented, the lawyers who attended at the birth of the modern administrative
state insisted on an intensely legalistic approach to policing the exercise of
federal administrative power.224 Today’s lawyers insist on much the same.225
217. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE
L.J. 1032, 1079 (2011).
218 . See MELNICK, supra note 75.
219 . Cf . Gluck et al., supra note 162, at 1839–43 (considering whether unorthodox poli-
cymaking in the administrative state enhances or detracts from agency legitimacy).
220 . See generally DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014) (documenting the central role that lawyers
played in crafting administrative law).
221. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2006).
222. Chinoy & Ma, supra note 203.
223 . See Norman Gross, Presidential Bar Leaders: Fascinating Facts About America’s
Lawyer-Presidents, ABA (June 15, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/
publications/bar_leader/2009_10/january_february/presidential/ [perma.cc/9EV2-6R84];
JOHNSON, Lyndon Baines, (1908–1973), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, http://
bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=j000160 [https://perma.cc/UN6N-UJWA].
224. ERNST, supra note 220, at 6–7.
225 . See Kagan, supra note 52, at 7 (“[I]f lawyers make the laws, promulgate the regula-
tions, and decide the court cases, one would expect them to perpetuate legal forms and val-
ues—including ready access to courts, due process norms, strong rights to legal representation,
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But is this “rule of lawyers” a healthy approach to governance?226 By measur-
ing the legitimacy of state power against an antiquated, unrealistic, and
court-centric template, lawyers both create and stoke the legitimacy crisis.227
Indeed, Jeremy Kessler worries that this “lawyerly hegemony” reflects “the
capture of the administrative state by lawyers themselves.”228
In any event, claims about legitimacy tacitly ascribe the lawyerly anxiety
about procedural irregularity to the broader public—a public that, as it hap-
pens, is mercifully unaware of picayune debates over administrative proce-
dure.229 But leveraging the public’s (imaginary) anxieties further insulates a
given procedure from challenge. For even if all the lawyers agree that a given
procedure is useless, wasteful, and capricious, who’s to say that the public
sees matters the same way? If the public is anxious, the performance of ad-
hering to procedural rules may itself signal the agency’s conscientiousness
and thus conduce to its legitimacy. Framed that way, the claim about legiti-
macy is unfalsifiable: a procedure is either worthy of adherence for its own
sake or worthy of adherence because of what it signals to the public. Indeed,
the more burdensome the procedural rule, the more convincing the perfor-
mance of adhering to that rule will be—and the greater the legitimacy payoff.
The rhetoric of legitimacy thus transforms a procedure’s costs into a benefit,
supplying a ready defense for even the most taxing procedural rule.
Often, too, administrative law deals with the rights and obligations of
corporations, for which the very concept of sociological legitimacy is an
awkward fit. In general, these artificial entities will have a relatively instru-
mental attitude toward agency action, and their compliance with the law is
less likely to turn on some ambient sense of legal, ethical, or moral obliga-
tion. For them, a cold-blooded weighing of the material risks of noncompli-
ance (agency enforcement, shareholder lawsuits, reputational damage, etc.)
will matter more. The claim that proceduralism supports the sociological le-
gitimacy of agencies thus depends on the specification of the relevant audi-
ence. When the audience is an individual whose personal rights are at issue,
the very act of attending to formal procedures may enhance an agency’s so-
ciological legitimacy.230 When the audience is corporate America, however,
it pays to be skeptical.
More generally, the legitimacy rhetoric tends to assume that agencies are
so heedless of their legitimacy that they routinely avoid procedures that
and a significant policymaking and oversight role for the judiciary—that preserve lawyers’ in-
fluence on legal reform and implementation.”).
226 . See ERNST, supra note 220, at 143.
227. Kessler, supra note 15, at 726, 762–72.
228 . Id. at 725, 761.
229 . See Adrian Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, CATO UNBOUND (May 9, 2016),
https://www.cato-unbound.org/print-issue/2054 [https://perma.cc/4L6Q-9EAB] (arguing that
the rhetoric of a “legitimacy crisis” is not “evidence-based” and that “the broad mass of citizen-
ry seems quite pleased . . . to live in an administrative state”).
230 . See TYLER, supra note 208, at 4 (considering the role that procedural regularity plays
in people’s perception of the legitimacy of government action).
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might have enhanced it. That assumption is unwarranted. In fact, agencies
carefully cultivate their reputations—with the regulated community, the
public, Congress, and other audiences—so they can better achieve their
goals.231 Reputation is not quite the same thing as sociological legitimacy, but
the two concepts are related: an agency with a poor reputation is more likely
to be thought illegitimate. Because procedural regularity can foster a reputa-
tion for evenhandedness and care, agencies can and often do go above and
beyond the procedural rules that administrative law imposes on them.232 To
be sure, agencies committed to their own mission may be less attentive to
public values or private fairness than we might collectively wish. And an
agency’s concerns with preserving its reputation can be pathological—if they
yield a cover-up, for example.233 But it is wrong to think that agencies will
attend to their sociological legitimacy only if they are legally compelled to do
so.
It’s telling that many of the institutions in our society that enjoy the
greatest legitimacy are those least subject to proceduralism. The decisions of
the Federal Reserve, for example, matter enormously for lives and liveli-
hoods across the country. Yet those decisions are not subject to the tradi-
tional constraints of administrative law. The Fed does not use notice-and-
comment rulemaking to set the federal funds rate;234 as an independent
agency, it is exempt from centralized review;235 and its oversight functions
are shielded from judicial superintendence.236 Peter Conti-Brown’s recent
book on the Fed’s “remarkable metamorphosis” over the twentieth century
into a powerful and independent central bank barely mentions administra-
tive procedures or the courts, and for good reason: they’re not a big part of
the story.237 Yet the Fed faces no crisis of legitimacy. To the contrary, 63% of
Americans hold positive views of the Fed, and just 19% view it unfavora-
231. CARPENTER, supra note 209; Kristina Daugirdas, Reputation as a Disciplinarian of
International Organizations, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 221 (2019).
232 . See Elizabeth Magill, supra note 27, at 860.
233. Daugirdas, supra note 231, at 237–40.
234 . See, e .g ., Regulation D: Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 83 Fed.
Reg. 13,104, 13,105 (Mar. 27, 2018) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 201) (finding “good cause”
because “[n]otice and public comment would prevent the Board’s action from being effective
as promptly as necessary in the public interest, and would not otherwise serve any useful pur-
pose”); Regulation D: Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 82 Fed. Reg. 7636,
7637 (Jan. 23, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 204) (using precisely the same boilerplate).
235. 12 U.S.C. § 250 (2012).
236 . See Cont’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Martin, 303 F.2d 214, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (holding
that a Federal Reserve Board order requiring a bank to sell shares to raise capital was unre-
viewable, taking into account “the important public responsibilities of the Board”).
237. PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 6
(2016) (“[T]he law has generally played a limited role in central banking operations.” (quoting
ROSA M LASTRA, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND MONETARY LAW § 2.01 (2d ed. 2015))); see
also Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints, 78 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 3, 2015, at 65, 66 (“Using traditional mechanisms to make the Fed more politically
accountable could substantially impede the Fed’s capacity to achieve the aims assigned to it.”).
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bly.238 Popularity isn’t the same as legitimacy, but, as with reputation, the
two are related. And a 63% popularity rating would be the envy of most in-
stitutions in the United States today.
Or take the Defense Department, another agency that wields immense
power over both lives and resources. The APA exempts anything pertaining
to a military function from the procedural obligations that normally attend
rulemaking or adjudication;239 it defines “agency” to exclude courts martial,
military commissions, and “military authority exercised in the field in time
of war or in occupied territory”;240 and it makes unreviewable questions
“committed to agency discretion by law,”241 which includes sensitive choices
about allocating troops or equipment.242 What is more, as Jonathan Masur
has argued, “[c]ourts have diverged drastically from the principles outlined
in . . . administrative law jurisprudence when confronted with cases they un-
derstand as involving military or wartime matters.”243 Whether defensible on
the merits or not, the special treatment afforded to the military has not
drained it of legitimacy. To the contrary, as Gallup has reported, “[w]hile
Americans’ faith in many U.S. institutions has fallen from the levels of previ-
ous decades, the public’s confidence in the military has remained consistent-
ly high.”244
Until recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) routinely ignored
many of the procedural rules that govern other agencies—so much so that
“tax exceptionalism” has become a refrain in administrative law.245 Oppo-
nents of tax exceptionalism worry that it saps the IRS of its legitimacy. Kris-
tin Hickman, for example, says that the IRS’s “growing reputation for
noncompliance with APA requirements” will likely yield “decreased respect
for the legitimacy of the tax system and, in turn, a decline in voluntary com-
238 . Majorities Express Favorable Opinions of Several Federal Agencies, Including the FBI,
PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.people-press.org/2018/02/14/majorities-express-
favorable-opinions-of-several-federal-agencies-including-the-fbi/ [https://perma.cc/4A5P-
CP9D].
239. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1), 554(a)(4) (2012).
240. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(F), (G) (2012).
241. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
242. Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 130–33 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (materiel); United States ex
rel . Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371, 375 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968) (reserve troops).
243. Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Def-
erence, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 443 (2005).
244 . See Frank Newport, Americans Continue to Express Highest Confidence in Military,
GALLUP (June 17, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/192917/americans-continue-express-
highest-confidence-military.aspx?g_source=military&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles
[https://perma.cc/W6QG-TZVT].
245 . See, e .g ., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting
Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006). For a recent set of pa-
pers on tax exceptionalism, see Amandeep S. Grewal, Foreword, Taking Administrative Law to
Tax, 63 DUKE L.J. 1625 (2014).
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pliance with the tax laws.”246 Really? Although the IRS has never been popu-
lar—no taxman is—study after study shows that individuals in the United
States still pay their taxes, even when the threat of enforcement is low and
when paying, in a narrow economic sense, is irrational.247 To the extent that
an agency’s legitimacy sustains a normative commitment to adhering to the
law, the IRS would seem to be legitimate, tax exceptionalism notwithstand-
ing. Nor is it plausible to think that taxpayers would more readily pay their
taxes if the IRS adhered to the full panoply of procedures applicable to other
agencies. The fact of the matter is that the public neither knows nor cares if
the IRS cuts the APA’s procedural corners.248 There may be good arguments
in favor of undoing tax exceptionalism. Enhancing the IRS’s legitimacy isn’t
one of them.
Finally, consider the thousands of police agencies—federal, state, and lo-
cal—scattered throughout the country. As Barry Friedman and Maria
Ponomarenko remind us, “[o]f all the agencies of executive government,
those that ‘police’—i .e . that engage in surveillance and employ force—are the
most threatening to the liberties of the American people.”249 Police depart-
ments do face challenges to their legitimacy, particularly in minority com-
munities. Nonetheless, they are held in high esteem across most of the
public, with 57% of Americans reporting “ ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of
confidence in” the police.250 Is that because police adhere to rigorous admin-
istrative procedures? Not at all. “[F]rom the standpoint of democratic gov-
ernance, they are the least regulated,” especially when “[c]ompared to the
sprawling administrative codes that detail every aspect of agency practice.”251
246. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Petitioners at 5,
Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 136 S. Ct. 2429 (2016) (No. 15-969); see also
Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Tax as Everylaw: Interpretation, Enforcement, and the
Legitimacy of the IRS, 69 TAX LAW. 493, 496 (2016) (arguing that treating the IRS as “an agency
like any other” will avoid the threat to its legitimacy). OIRA recently signed a memorandum of
understanding with the Treasury Department (which houses the IRS) that would, for the first
time, subject “[t]ax regulatory actions” to review—and hired Hickman to help put that com-
mitment into operation. See Memorandum of Agreement, Dep’t of the Treasury & Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866 (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/0412818cc1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DC6-
Y635]; Prof . Hickman Named Special Adviser to OIRA, U. MINN. L. SCH. (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.law.umn.edu/news/2018-04-18-prof-hickman-named-special-adviser-oira
[https://perma.cc/G7KZ-55X5].
247 . See TYLER, supra note 208, at 45–47.
248 . See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE (2013).
249. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1827, 1830–31 (2015).
250. Jim Norman, Confidence in Police Back at Historical Average, GALLUP (July 10,
2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/213869/confidence-police-back-historical-average.aspx
[https://perma.cc/MKS7-P94M].
251. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 249, at 1831.
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In truth, administrative law matters much less to an agency’s legitimacy
than lawyers like to think.252 And even in those cases when legitimacy claims
have some force, an invocation of legitimacy is usually too general and vague
to aid in specifying the content of a procedural rule.253 It’s reasonable to
think, for example, that the sociological legitimacy of an agency’s action
turns in part on whether the agency has explained why it did what it did.254
But how should administrative law cash out that duty to explain? Must the
agency offer an explanation at the time it issues its decision?255 How specific
does that explanation have to be?256 Should courts review the substance of
the explanation, and, if so, how vigorously?257 What should the penalty be
for failing to explain adequately?258 Agencies may have a duty to explain
themselves, but it doesn’t follow that Chenery I was rightly decided or that
hard-look review is indispensable.
Similarly, it might be that a rule’s sociological legitimacy partly turns on
whether the public has been afforded a chance to be heard prior to its adop-
tion. But agencies can (and do) discharge their duty to listen in all sorts of
ways: through stakeholder meetings, the designation of public representa-
tives, structured briefing of competing views, advertising campaigns to solic-
it input, negotiated rulemaking, and more. An agency’s legitimacy does not
depend on adhering to the finicky particularities of notice and comment. An
invocation of legitimacy thus contributes nothing to a defense of those par-
ticularities.
Administrative lawyers also tend to overlook the ways that procedural-
ism can erode legitimacy. One example: In a perceptive report on agency
guidance, Nicholas Parrillo has documented the wide range of different ap-
proaches—ranging from formal notice and comment to off-the-record
phone calls—that agencies use to solicit feedback on guidance documents.
He concludes that more procedural formality may sometimes yield greater
legitimacy, but not always. At times, the costs of notice and comment can be
252 . Cf . Mashaw, supra note 72, at 421 (“Administrative law has always seemed to walk a
fine line between impertinence and irrelevance.”).
253 . Cf . Metzger, supra note 14, at 44 (“The problem for anti-administrativists . . . is that
background separation of powers concerns can be addressed in a variety of ways, including
approaches that embrace the administrative state rather than cabin it.”).
254 . See generally MASHAW, supra note 189 (building an extended argument to that ef-
fect).
255 . Cf . Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 659,
666 (1997) (arguing that “courts might avoid many remands by showing more leniency in al-
lowing counsel on appeal to fill interstitial gaps in overly terse agency rationales”).
256 . Cf . Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (cau-
tioning “against an overly literal reading of the statutory terms ‘concise’ and ‘general’ ”).
257 . Cf . Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 56 (1983) (holding that “the agency has failed to offer the rational connection between
facts and judgment required to pass muster under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard”).
258 . Cf . Bagley, supra note 10, at 302–07 (explaining that “lower courts have exercised
more remedial flexibility than Chenery appears to display”).
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so acute that various stakeholders lose faith in the agency’s ability to address
their concerns. Notice and comment thus becomes “a factor that kills legiti-
macy, at least for part of the community.”259
By the same token, judicial review is supposed to enhance sociological
legitimacy because it encourages agencies to mind their p’s and q’s. Yet it al-
so advertises to the world, sometimes in mocking tones, the deficiencies of
agency action.260 Indeed, agencies don’t relish losing in court precisely be-
cause it damages their reputations, which can have a direct, negative effect
on their legitimacy.261 The effect is also asymmetric: it’s news when an agen-
cy loses in court, but rarely when it wins. Even more insidiously, high-
handed judicial review can suggest that judges are committed to political
neutrality and reasoned decisionmaking, while agencies are reckless, sloppy,
and partisan.262 That attitude breeds suspicion not only of agencies but also
of the entire project of democratic governance. And while the risk of bad
publicity may sometimes spur an agency to improve its performance, it may
also lead to fatalism within the agency’s ranks.
To cope with the encrustation of procedural constraints, resource-
strapped agencies may sometimes take to ignoring or sidestepping them.263
In so doing, they display a disregard for law that can itself undermine their
legitimacy. FOIA, for example, imposes obligations on agencies that they
cannot possibly meet, leading to widespread disenchantment with those very
agencies. The result, as David Pozen argues, is that “[t]he FOIA process per-
forms the very sort of government dysfunction that the Act is then enlisted to
expose.”264 The point generalizes. The claim that an agency has avoided pro-
cedural rules becomes a focal point for attack, whether or not the rules do
more harm than good. Agencies are then bashed in court and in the press for
their purported negligence or carelessness. Sometimes the bashing is war-
ranted; often it is not. Either way, it’s hard to see how publicly shaming fed-
eral agencies for failing to do what they were never equipped to do conduces
to their legitimacy. It instead reinforces the perception that government is
incompetent.
In any event—and this is the really crucial point—we’ve now run a half-
century experiment into whether stringent procedural rules will yield an
259. PARRILLO, supra note 141, at 165.
260 . See, e .g ., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (nee-
dling EPA for arguing that “daily” could be read to mean “seasonal” or “annual”).
261 . See, e .g ., CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL (2009) (documenting how the “en-
gine of pressure” to reform police departments, government human relations departments, and
play equipment was not the financial penalties associated with tort suits but the bad publicity
associated with lawsuits and the concomitant threat to professional legitimacy).
262 . Cf . Josh Chafetz, Governing and Deciding Who Governs, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73,
75 (documenting the rhetorical strategies that the Supreme Court uses to suggest that it is
“somehow removed from the arena of partisan politics”).
263 . See Mashaw, supra note 72, at 420–21 (highlighting this risk).
264. David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1135 (2017).
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administrative state that its opponents view as fundamentally legitimate.
That experiment has failed. The root of antipathy to federal agencies is not
that they act without procedural safeguards. It is distrust of state power, full
stop. Liberals were wrong to ever think that embracing legally mandated
procedures would yield some kind of bipartisan détente that empowered
agencies to get on with their work. They are wrong today to indulge the same
tired belief.
My claim is not that proceduralism and sociological legitimacy have
nothing to do with one another. My claim is that it’s a mistake to assume,
without knowing more about the effects of particular procedures at particu-
lar agencies, that the relationship is a positive one. One example to drive the
point home. After the Supreme Court twice rebuked EPA and the Army
Corps of Engineers for reading the Clean Water Act too expansively,265 the
agencies launched a rulemaking to narrow their definition of a key statutory
term, “waters of the United States.” The new rule aimed to give property
owners clarity about which waters on their property fell within the agencies’
jurisdiction. Knowing that any rule they selected would be controversial, and
recognizing the need for input and technical assistance, the agencies
launched a vigorous outreach campaign, enlisted the aid of an independent
scientific advisory board, reviewed hundreds of thousands of their past ju-
risdictional determinations, received and responded to more than a million
comments, and compiled a scientific report canvassing 1,200 peer-reviewed
studies.266
Over the course of the protracted rulemaking, the agencies returned
again and again to a key question: Which wetlands are closely enough related
to navigable waters that they should count as “waters of the United States”?
For decades, the agencies had used a loose standard to judge whether a wet-
land was an “adjacent water” that fell within their jurisdiction.267 Many
property owners and states wanted the agencies to adopt a crisp rule, one
based on the distance of the wetland from so-called “jurisdictional waters.”
The debate—rule or standard?—was a central theme of the rulemaking. Ini-
tially, EPA and the Army Corps proposed defining adjacent waters through a
“reasonable proximity” standard.268 But because “this may result in some
uncertainty,” they also invited comments on “other reasonable options,” in-
cluding bright-line distance limitations.269 All told, the agencies received
hundreds of comments about the definition of adjacent waters, the majority
265 . See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
266. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,057, 37,065 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified
at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
267 . See, e .g ., Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg.
31,320 (proposed May 6, 1975).
268. Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg.
22,188, 22,208 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
269 . Id .
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of which concluded that the proposed definition of “adjacent” was “too
vague” and “too expansive.”270 The “dominant request” was to adopt a
rule.271
So the agencies did.272 A number of states promptly sued, arguing,
among other things, that the final rule was not a logical outgrowth of the
proposed rule—even though many of those states had themselves specifically
asked the agencies to adopt bright-line distance limitations.273 The Sixth Cir-
cuit agreed with the plaintiffs—it called the rulemaking process “facially sus-
pect”—and entered a nationwide injunction.274 Shortly after, President
Trump took office. On his instructions,275 EPA and the Army Corps sus-
pended the Obama-era rule to make way for its rescission.276
One year after Trump’s inauguration, the Supreme Court overturned
the Sixth Circuit injunction on jurisdictional grounds.277 Yet that ruling left
intact the agencies’ suspension of the Obama-era rule—until August 2018,
when a South Carolina district court held that the suspension was itself un-
lawful because it didn’t go through notice and comment.278 The court en-
tered a nationwide injunction against the Trump Administration’s effort to
suspend the Obama-era rule, which thus sprang back into force. So too,
however, did two district court injunctions that had previously been entered
against the Obama-era rule, one out of North Dakota covering thirteen
states279 and the other out of Georgia covering another eleven.280 As a result
of the competing injunctions, roughly half the states are subject to the
Obama-era rule and the other half to older rules of dubious legality. The pre-
cise figure is in flux—appeals are pending, as are other lawsuits elsewhere
against the Obama-era rule.281 The Trump Administration, in the meantime,
270. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN WATER RULE RESPONSE TO COMMENTS – TOPIC
3: ADJACENT WATERS 18, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/
cwr_response_to_comments_3_adjacent_waters.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YCE-W8QE].
271 . Id .
272. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (July 13, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
328).
273 . In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 2015).
274 . Id . at 807, 809.
275. Exec. Order No. 13,778, 3 C.F.R. 298 (2018).
276. Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200 (Feb.
6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
277. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018).
278. S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.S.C. 2018) (en-
tering nationwide injunction of the rule’s suspension).
279. North Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015).
280. Georgia v. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (S.D. Ga. 2018).
281 . See, e .g ., Ohio v. EPA, No. 2:15-CV-2467, 2019 WL 1368850, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
26, 2019) (“The Government has appealed the South Carolina District Court’s Order that en-
joined the Suspension Rule. The Government also moved the District Court to stay the injunc-
tion pending appeal. The District Court has denied that motion. As such, the Clean Water Rule
is currently in effect in the Plaintiff States [Ohio and Tennessee].” (citations omitted)).
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is proceeding with a rulemaking to rescind the Obama-era rule and to adopt
a third set of rules,282 which will themselves be embroiled in litigation for
years.
As a result, seventeen years after the Supreme Court first held that EPA’s
and the Army Corps’ regulations were legally defective,283 no replacement is
in place. Many more years will pass before one is. Several different features
of proceduralism are at work here: the ready availability of preenforcement
review, the excessiveness of notice-and-comment rulemaking, and the zeal-
ous application of the logical outgrowth standard. In combination, they have
made it next to impossible for the agencies to offer any certainty about the
scope of the Clean Water Act. There’s nothing ennobling about that. It
doesn’t conduce to EPA’s or the Army Corps’ legitimacy to watch them get
tripped up on technicalities in politically charged lawsuits brought by those
with substantive objections to their interpretation of the Clean Water Act.
Quite the opposite.
B. Public Accountability
1. The Rhetoric of Capture
When legitimacy runs out as a justification for proceduralism, claims
about the threat to public accountability from “agency capture” come to the
fore. The meaning of capture has shifted over the decades,284 and the term is
sometimes used loosely to refer to the exercise of any undesirable influence
over an agency. When used more precisely, however, capture is understood
to arise when relatively small groups deploy their superior organizational
abilities to distort agency decisions at the expense of the diffuse public.285 So
understood, capture is a regulatory manifestation of public choice theory.286
“Agency capture” is in many respects an unfortunate term. As a meta-
phor, it suggests an all-or-nothing state of affairs—that an agency is either
free from undue influence or wholly controlled by it. In truth, capture is a
matter of degree. Few agencies are so imprudent as to ignore groups with an
282 . See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154 (proposed
Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
283. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
284. Early conceptions of capture saw agencies as the clients of the industries they regu-
lated, concerned not with the public interest but with protecting incumbent industries from
competitive pressures. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 8, at 1284–85. For two influential ac-
counts, see MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
(1955), and Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads,
and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 498 (1952). Over time, “more subtle explanations of
industry orientation” have come to the fore. Stewart, supra note 149, at 1685.
285 . See Nicholas Bagley, Response, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 2
(2010); see also Merrill, supra note 35, at 1053.
286 . See OLSON, supra note 147; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
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intense interest in their work; by the same token, few agencies are strictly
under their thumbs.287 Generalized invocations of capture also gloss over the
causal mechanism through which capture is supposed to occur. It’s simply
assumed, usually without evidence or explanation, that powerful groups will
find ways to twist regulatory outputs to their ends. That dark, conspiratorial
view implies that agencies have neither the internal resources nor the incli-
nation to resist capture. Corruption is just the nature of the beast.288
Even setting capture’s rhetorical baggage aside, nailing down the scope
and extent of capture presents a difficult and probably insoluble problem.289
How do you know when private interests have improperly pulled the levers
of power to their advantage? In a democracy, it is not intrinsically problem-
atic for a committed minority to prevail over a large, somewhat apathetic
majority. To the contrary, depending on the relative intensity of views in
play, any plausible conception of deliberative democracy suggests that the
minority should sometimes prevail. Agency capture thus does not arise
merely because the agency attends to narrow interests. Capture requires
something more—namely, a judgment that the pressure brought was undue
in some sense.290 But what counts as undue? “[B]y itself,” as Einer Elhauge
has argued, interest group theory “cannot generate any normative conclu-
sion about whether the group’s influence was disproportionate to the influ-
ence it should have had.”291 A belief that capture exists must thus rest on an
“implicit normative baseline[].”292 Maybe the agency has not maximized net
benefits, maybe its action has unacceptable distributional consequences, or
maybe the agency has squandered property held in the public trust. Whatev-
er the baseline, any assessment of capture will turn on a judgment of whether
the agency has inappropriately privileged a well-knit group’s views over the
public’s.
So when we fight about capture, we’re really fighting over whose views
ought to matter. Naturally, we don’t agree about that, which is why there’s
no consensus over the extent to which agency capture has taken hold at a
particular agency or across the administrative state. At the same time, even if
capture is hard to nail down in a satisfactory way, we all recognize that small,
well-heeled groups do punch above their weight when it comes to getting
what they want from government. Capture thus manages the trick of being
both elusive and ubiquitous: an ever-present fear about the administrative
287 . See WILSON, supra note 103, at 75–76.
288 . Cf . William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE 25 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014).
289 . See Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE, supra note 288, at 1.
290 . See Bagley, supra note 285, at 4.
291. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?,
101 YALE L.J. 31, 51 (1991).
292 . Id . at 34.
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state, but a fear that can’t be measured and can never be entirely eradicat-
ed.293
If agencies are at perpetual risk of succumbing to capture, it’s natural to
cast about for solutions. For administrative law, those solutions come in the
form of procedures.294 And so every administrative procedure under the sun
has been defended on the ground that it combats capture. Notice-and-
comment rulemaking, for example, “makes it much more difficult for there
to be agency capture.”295 Cost-benefit analysis “furthers the important good
governance aim of avoiding agency capture by regulated parties.”296 OIRA
guards against the risk that regulation will “favor narrow, well-organized
groups at the expense of the general public.”297 Even formal rulemaking
might help “where regulatory capture is likely.”298
Broadly speaking, administrative lawyers tend to assume that any agency
procedure that demands more deliberation, more transparency, and more
rationality will mitigate the risk of agency capture. The assumption is in
some respects reasonable. A more deliberative action will incorporate input
from a wide array of actors, including the diffuse public, and possibly recon-
cile their competing priorities. A more transparent decision will allow courts
and voters to hold agencies accountable when they cater to private interests
at the expense of the public. And a more rational decision will reject partisan
influence and special pleading, adhering instead to neutral principles rooted
in the common good.
2. Capture Deflated
It is nonetheless wrong to assume that an agency procedure will dis-
courage capture simply because it aims to foster deliberation, transparency,
and rationality. The reverse will often be true.299 The reason is simple. To
293 . See Stewart, supra note 149, at 1684–85 (noting the “dogmatic tone that reflects set-
tled opinion” surrounding “the thesis of persistent bias in agency policies”).
294. Though not always. Rachel Barkow, for one example, has argued that agencies can
and should be designed at the outset to resist capture. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agen-
cies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010). Her focus on ex
ante institutional design, rather than ex post procedural control, is unusual in the literature.
295. David Fontana, Essay, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy In-
dex Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 91 (2005); see also Seifter, supra note 152, at 1330
(noting the common view that “[a]ctive participation from diverse entities can lessen the risk
that factional interests dominate, or even capture, agency decisions” (footnote omitted)).
296. Rose & Walker, supra note 157, at 14.
297. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1986).
298. Kent Barnett, Looking More Closely at the Platypus of Formal Rulemaking, REG. REV.
(May 11, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/11/barnett-platypus-formal-
rulemaking/ [https://perma.cc/E7S7-L2EL].
299 . Cf . Gluck et al., supra note 162, at 1842–43 (“The obvious challenge for any norma-
tive evaluation of accountability is that deliberation and public input are one type of measure,
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avoid getting drawn into contentious debates over political power, adminis-
trative law has a penchant for formal procedural equality: everyone is afford-
ed an equal opportunity to advance the values of deliberation, transparency,
and rationality. So industry associations participate on the same footing in
the administrative process as environmental groups, and every poverty-
stricken member of the public has the same right to have her voice heard as
the wealthiest banker. If procedural equality does not do enough to mitigate
capture, administrative law scholars are prone to call for still more proce-
dures that afford still more opportunities to participate, monitor, and push
back. Maybe then the public’s voice will finally cut through the interest-
group din.
All of this recalls Anatole France’s quip: “In its majestic equality, the law
forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets and steal
loaves of bread.” Administrative law takes public choice theory seriously
when it diagnoses capture as a central pathology of the administrative state.
In offering a cure, however, it overlooks what the theory implies about ad-
ministrative law’s formally neutral brand of proceduralism. Exploiting a pro-
cedural opportunity takes time, attention, and resources. The same interest
groups that are the villains of the capture narrative can deploy their relative
organizational advantages to pull procedural levers with more frequency and
greater expertise than groups representing the public interest. Under some
conditions, the proliferation of procedural opportunities will magnify the
ability of well-organized groups to influence agency decisions, not the re-
verse. Proceduralism can thus exacerbate the very capture dynamic that it’s
meant to remedy.
As with legitimacy, there is no necessary or straightforward connection
between procedural rules and the mitigation of capture. Some administrative
procedures may sometimes make agencies more attentive to the public inter-
est. Others, however, will afford the powerful with yet more chances to bend
agencies to their will. It all depends on how the procedure plays out on the
ground. In pressing the point, I mean to remain agnostic about whether fa-
cially neutral procedural rules, over time and on balance, will systematically
and inevitably privilege the voices of the haves over the have-nots.300 If that
were the case, the solution might be for administrative law to embrace a
more overtly political (and controversial) agenda—one that amplified work-
ers’ voices, for example, even as it muffled industry’s.301 I’m sympathetic to
that argument, but it is not mine here. I mean, instead, to argue that admin-
istrative law’s reflexive proceduralism fares poorly even when measured
but direct legislative accountability is another, and the ability of government to respond and
act is yet another. These values are often in tension . . . .”).
300 . Cf . Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
301 . See K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
315 (2018) (arguing for such an approach).
December 2019] The Procedure Fetish 393
against what I take to be the uncontroversial goal of avoiding interest-group
capture. There’s vast room for improvement.
In what follows, I’ll consider three domains in which the anti-capture
story is especially prominent: notice-and-comment rulemaking, FOIA, and
judicial review. In all three cases, administrative law’s taste for creating for-
mally neutral procedural opportunities has given small, well-organized
groups—in particular, industry—immense leverage over federal agencies. If
the glib anti-capture narrative cannot justify even these procedural rules, it’s
unlikely to have much persuasive force in any context.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking. Consistent with the predictions of
Mancur Olson’s work on group mobilization,302 business organizations
dominate the rulemaking process.303 Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb
Yackee, for example, examined forty rules across four agencies and found
that business interests submitted nine times as many comments as did public
interest groups.304 Those comments were also of higher quality and appeared
more likely to provoke changes. “The implication of our empirical results is
relatively clear: agencies appear to alter final rules to suit the expressed de-
sires of business commenters, but do not appear to alter rules to match the
expressed preferences of other kinds of interests.”305 The Yackees’ findings
accord with a study by Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters,
who examined ninety EPA rules governing the release of air toxins. Industry
submitted 81% of all the comments, with public interest groups submitting
just 4%.306 They found that an agency’s rule was more apt to be weakened as
the number of comments increased.307 Earlier work from Cary Coglianese,
who examined the development of hazardous waste rules at EPA over a
three-year period, similarly concludes that industry groups submitted more
than thirty times more comments than public interest groups.308 Other stud-
ies reinforce these findings.309
302 . See OLSON, supra note 147.
303 . See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 132 (2008) (reviewing
studies and concluding that “business or industry interests participate in agency decisionmak-
ing processes significantly more than other, broad-based types of interests, especially as meas-
ured by the frequency and volume of their participation”).
304. Yackee & Yackee, supra note 148, at 133.
305 . Id . at 135.
306. Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air
Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 128–29 (2011).
307 . Id . at 131.
308. Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the
Regulatory Process, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 735, 743 (1996) (finding that industry submitted 67%
of all comments, where 2% came from environmental groups).
309 . See Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons:
Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics, 63 J. POL. 1191, 1199–1205 (2001)
(examining similar parties of lobbying activity); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: In-
corporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 126–42 (1998) (reviewing stud-
ies); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates?
Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245 (1998) (finding that business
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Why do more comments appear to buy more influence? The empirical
picture is puzzling because, as Steve Croley has argued, the informational
value of comments has very little to do with their volume. In theory, a single
comment from a public-interest group should be at least as persuasive as a
deluge of duplicative comments from industry.310 But the actual practice of
notice and comment complicates that pat story.311 Although agencies in
principle need only to respond to “vital” comments,312 they cannot reliably
anticipate which comments a reviewing court might someday find vital.
Risk-averse agencies therefore have little choice but to respond, often in pu-
nitive length and detail, to all the substantive comments they receive. At the
same time, administrative law places no filter on the information that com-
mentators can submit to agencies. Recognizing as much, industry swamps
agencies with hundreds of comments containing thousands of pages of un-
structured, highly technical information, typically pertaining to regulatory
costs.313 Responding to those comments not only drains agency resources,
but it also raises the costs of participation for everyone else. Groups that lack
the resources to participate on the same footing as industry—which is to say,
groups representing a diffuse public interest—find themselves at a disad-
vantage in debating industry’s technical arguments. Facing a stark participa-
tion imbalance, a rational agency will attend to the interests of those who
credibly threaten legal action.314 To quell the threat of litigation, the agency
may cave on key industry demands: better a weak rule than no rule at all.315
As Wagner puts it, “[e]ven if the consequences are unintended, the parties
with the resources to feed the information monster will benefit, to the detri-
ment of actors with fewer resources and the administrative system as a
whole.”316
For a time, the rise of the internet was thought to have the potential to
reshape these persistent participatory imbalances. Surely the public would
more regularly voice its concerns, the thinking ran, if submitting a comment
participates disproportionately in notice-and-comment rulemaking); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
GOV’T AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, VOL. III: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEEDINGS 12 (Comm. Print 1977) (same).
310 . See CROLEY, supra note 303, at 136.
311. Wagner, supra note 91.
312. United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977).
313. Wagner, supra note 91, at 1325; see also Jonathan Weinberg, The Right to Be Taken
Seriously, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149, 152 (2012) (“In practice, agencies are often swamped by
comments and pay serious attention to only some of them. They attend to those comments
filed by repeat players with instrumental power and may send the rest off to outside contrac-
tors to be ignored.”).
314 . See Wagner, supra note 91, at 1333–34 (“Even when agency staff can withstand the
technical minutia coming at them at high speed and under tight time constraints, they face an
administrative record that is badly lopsided, and threats of lawsuits against the substance of
their regulation that come predominantly from only one sector (industry).”).
315 . See id . at 1351.
316 . Id . at 1326.
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were as easy as sending an email. Yet “e-rulemaking” hasn’t lived up the
hype, notwithstanding assiduous efforts to cultivate public participation.317 It
takes resources, time, and expertise to monitor an agency’s rulemaking
docket, read voluminous Federal Register notices, cut through the technical
jargon, and formulate a genuinely useful comment. It’s rational for an indi-
vidual not to make that sort of investment given how little she stands to gain
from the slight possibility of changing an agency’s mind. It’s true that, in rare
cases, the internet has facilitated the submission of huge numbers of com-
ments from individuals, but to what end? A torrent of general comments of
support or opposition may offer some rough sense of public sentiment, but
they offer little in the way of argument or data and are unlikely to shape the
agency’s thinking.318
Indeed, lopsided participation during notice and comment may under-
state the imbalance. Judicial enforcement of the logical outgrowth standard
has shifted much of the debate over agency rules to the pre-notice stage,
where industry has an even more sizeable advantage.319 In a recent study on
the Volcker Rule, adopted pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Kimberly Krawiec finds that 93% of all con-
tacts with federal agencies prior to the rule’s issuance came from financial
institutions and their representatives.320 Similarly, in reviewing pre-notice
contacts at EPA, Wagner, Barnes, and Peters report that industry groups had
170 times the number of meetings, letters, and phone calls with the agency
than public interest groups.321
The modern notice-and-comment process is thus poorly designed to
mitigate capture. For many rulemakings, perhaps most, it may make the
problem worse. That’s not to deny that notice and comment sometimes gives
groups representing the diffuse public interest a voice they would have oth-
erwise lacked. But a notice-and-comment process designed to combat cap-
ture would look very different than the one we have. Wagner, for example,
offers several reform proposals, including the subsidization of groups orient-
ed to the public interest322 and strict limits on the volume of information in-
troduced into the notice-and-comment process.323 It is a failure of legal
imagination to assume that fostering public participation demands a set of
317 . See Cynthia R. Farina, Achieving the Potential: The Future of Federal E-Rulemaking
(2009), 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 279 (2010).
318. Mendelson, supra note 154.
319. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1495 (1992).
320. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Fi-
nancial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 59 (2013).
321. Wagner et al., supra note 306, at 125. Industry similarly dominates the OIRA review
process, albeit to a less significant degree. Steve Croley examined OIRA’s meeting logs over an
eight-year period and found that “narrow interests” (including industry) participated at twice
the rate of “broad interests” (including public-interest groups). Steven Croley, White House
Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 858 (2003).
322. Wagner, supra note 91, at 1416.
323 . Id . at 1419.
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procedural rules that give a decisive advantage to groups that do not repre-
sent the public interest.
Transparency Laws. A similar dynamic plagues FOIA, the primary
transparency law governing federal agencies. As Margaret Kwoka has metic-
ulously documented, FOIA is used most intensively by “private entities that
seek information as part of their profit-making enterprise.”324 It’s not even
close. News outlets submit a paltry number of FOIA requests relative to cor-
porate interests, which use FOIA to unearth information about competitors,
to compile and resell government data at a profit, and to advise investors on
an agency’s regulatory strategy.325 None of this advances the public interest;
to the contrary, as Kwoka argues, FOIA often seems to function as little
more than an implicit corporate subsidy.326 Worse, “[t]he sheer volume of
commercial requests likely contributes to the delay and inattention often ex-
perienced by constituencies at the heart of FOIA’s intended use: the press
and watchdog groups whose mission is to enhance external oversight of gov-
ernmental activity and promote democratic governance.”327 FOIA thus al-
lows private interests to clog the information channels, compromising its
efforts to foster transparency to the public.
Quite apart from the direct compliance costs, the costs to agencies of re-
sponding to the flood of FOIA requests—and those costs are enormous328—
divert agency resources and personnel away from the agency’s mission and
into information management. FOIA thus imposes what David Pozen calls a
tax on bureaucratic capacity, raising the costs of agency action in a manner
that (not coincidentally) aligns with the business community’s preference for
a weakened administrative state.329 And for what? Evidence that FOIA sys-
tematically promotes good governance is elusive, even as the Act discourages
frank internal deliberation, undermines agencies’ ability to cooperate with
private actors, and embarrasses agencies that lack the capacity to expedi-
324. Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc ., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1365 (2016); see also David E.
Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 156–57 (2018) (“Populist in princi-
ple, this refusal to ration the transparency entitlement—coupled in the case of FOIA with a
requester-driven, litigation-intensive procedure—has led in practice to a user base heavily
skewed toward business enterprises. Many firms have a strong, steady motivation to learn what
their regulators and competitors are up to, or to resell taxpayer-subsidized information to third
parties. As a class, they are also far more likely than citizen-investigators or resource-strapped
nonprofits to have the time, money, and expertise to navigate the FOIA bureaucracy, monitor
congressional hearings, or parse high-value datasets—and then to exploit the information they
acquire for private gain.” (footnote omitted)).
325 . See Kwoka, supra note 324, at 1365.
326 . See id . at 1415.
327 . Id .
328 . See Pozen, supra note 264, at 1135.
329 . See id . at 1113, 1123.
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tiously process FOIA requests.330 Far from mitigating capture, “FOIA’s re-
quest-driven structure . . . invites a kind of corporate capture.”331
That’s not an indictment of all transparency laws. It’s just an indictment
of FOIA. Pozen suggests, for example, shifting toward a regime in which
agencies would be required to disclose information without waiting for a re-
quest from a private actor.332 FOIA itself, however, is inattentive to the way
that corporate requesters can exploit its operational machinery for their pri-
vate ends.333
Hard-look review. The widespread claim that hard-look review of agency
action will discourage agency capture is equally misplaced.334 It rests on the
assumption that “by changing the procedural rules that govern agency deci-
sionmaking and by engaging in more aggressive review of agency decisions
[the courts] could force agencies to open their doors—and their minds—to
formerly unrepresented points of view, with the result that capture would be
eliminated or at least reduced.”335 The story is appealing, and it resonates in
a legal culture that venerates the righteous judge who stands above political
330 . See id . at 1125–28.
331 . Id . at 1117. FACA and GITSA have also been criticized on similar grounds. Id . at
1128. Because of the harsh glare of publicity, agencies have curtailed their use of advisory
committees, and commissioners of multimember agencies rarely meet to discuss policy. See
Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Pro-
cess: Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 953 (2009)
(“The requirements FACA imposes on agencies . . . have significantly curtailed or even inhibit-
ed agencies’ use of advisory committees.”); Randolph May, Recent Development, Reforming
the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 416 (1997) (noting the “fairly widespread consensus”
that “the Act’s ‘open meeting’ requirement curtails meaningful collective deliberation and sub-
stantive exchange of ideas among agency members”).
332 . See Pozen, supra note 264, at 1148–55.
333. In general, “[p]rogressive-minded reformers of the 1960s and 1970s . . . focused too
much on the power of their transparency tools and not enough on the power structures that
would condition their use.” Pozen, supra note 324, at 157. Much the same could be said about
the procedural constraints that the same set of reformers stitched into administrative law. See
Merrill, supra note 35, at 1040 (“[W]ithout denying that a desire to promote progressive causes
may have influenced some of these decisions, the reforms were in fact poorly designed to
achieve such a targeted result.”).
334. For a sustained argument that concerns with agency capture drove the adoption of
hard-look review, see Merrill, supra note 35. For additional support, see Jack M. Beermann &
Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 880 (2007) (“Since
the late 1960s, courts concerned about industry capture of administrative agencies have used
[Section 706(2)(A) of the APA] to apply tough substantive standards to agency decision mak-
ing.”), and Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the
Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589, 1650 (2014) (“Judicial review might
mitigate the risk of capture of agencies by the parties they regulate.”).
335. Merrill, supra note 35, at 1043; see also Kagan, supra note 52, at 35 (“Public interest
lawyers . . . wanted to expand governmental regulatory power, but they also were profoundly
mistrustful of politicians and administrators, whom they viewed as inherently unresponsive or
as corruptible by regulated businesses. The reformers’ solution was to create an administrative
process that would mimic the adversarial, formal, participatory procedures of courts—the one
governmental institution they felt they could either trust or influence.”).
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horse-trading and seedy backroom deals. Yet the story holds true only if at
least five assumptions about agency incentives, interest-group dynamics, and
judicial capacity are also true. Each of these assumptions is either demon-
strably false or likely to be so. Their fragility knocks the legs out from under
the claim that hard-look review will reliably mitigate capture.
First, judicial review will induce an agency to avoid capture only as to
those decisions that, in the agency’s view, are likely to be challenged in court.
When industry dominates the interest-group environment, however, capture
will often manifest as agency inaction, which is almost never subject to
meaningful judicial review. (Capture may also manifest in the form of safe
harbors from enforcement—but standing doctrine and finality rules will
likely preclude review of any guidance that extends such safe harbors.336) If
judicial review will never come to pass, it affords an agency no reason to re-
sist capture.
Second, agencies must believe that resisting capture will improve the
likelihood that their decisions (at least those that can be challenged) will be
upheld in court. The opposite is probably closer to the truth. Mounting a
lawsuit is not cheap, and those same well-organized groups that drive a cap-
ture dynamic will have superior means to protect their interests in court.337
Groups representing the public interest will sue less frequently and, because
they play a less prominent role in shaping the administrative record, may be
less successful in the suits they bring. To test the point, I collected all the re-
ported cases from the D.C. Circuit and the D.C. District Court involving
challenges to agency rulemaking in 2015 and 2016. Of the 106 cases in the
sample, sixty-six—or about 62%—were brought by regulated entities or their
trade associations. Public interest groups participated in only half as many
cases (thirty).338 That’s a less stark imbalance than we see in notice and
comment, but courts are certainly not doing much to correct power imbal-
ances. As a result, and contrary to the neat anti-capture story, the risk of ju-
dicial review may tempt agencies to be especially solicitous to the very
groups that are responsible for capture.
336 . See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 420–21 (2007) (“[W]hen an agency enunciates its approach to enforc-
ing regulatory standards in a guidance rather than a rule, it will likely deny a regulatory benefi-
ciary the opportunity for judicial review that is eventually afforded to a regulated entity.”).
337 . See Frank B. Cross, Essay, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355,
355 (1999) (arguing that “the judicial process is more susceptible to manipulation by narrow
interests than are the more democratic branches of government and that expanding judicial
review of those branches would increase rather than decrease the influence of narrow special
interests on public policy”).
338. These figures should be taken as rough estimates for a number of reasons: (1) re-
ported opinions will correlate only loosely with the number of lawsuits; (2) multiple cases may
be consolidated; and (3) multiple rules can be challenged in any given case. Data supporting
the estimate are available upon request. Cases that appeared in both the district court and the
court of appeals in the two-year span were only counted once, as were cases that resulted in
multiple opinions.
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Third, hard-look review will discourage capture only if the actions that
courts invalidate as arbitrary are more likely to be the products of capture
than those they sustain. That’s also a dubious assumption. Agencies do not
advertise their corruption. Instead, they present public-regarding justifica-
tions for their actions. Those justifications may in rare cases be so thin that
courts reject them as pretext: NHTSA’s inexplicable refusal to consider the
possibility of mandating airbags in State Farm is the classic example.339 In
the typical case, however, an agency’s justification for its decision will be
plausible enough to warrant deference from the courts, even if the actual
motivation for the action was to advance the interests of a favored constitu-
ency. Indeed, groups that are well organized enough to capture an agency
will exploit that same resource advantage to devise elaborate, public-
regarding justifications for actions that are in fact designed to serve their pri-
vate interests. And so a better-defended agency action—one that offers espe-
cially professional, technical, and extensive justifications—could be a signal
of capture, not the reverse. At a minimum, the arbitrariness of an agency’s
justification for action correlates too weakly with agency capture to make it
plausible that hard-look review will reliably combat it.
Fourth, for the courts-prevent-capture story to be persuasive, the bene-
fits of invalidating capture-tainted agency actions must outweigh the costs of
incorrectly striking down public-regarding actions. Strictly speaking, that’s
an empirical claim. But there’s no reason to suppose it’s true. There may be
no crisp way to identify capture, but the federal bureaucracy is not shot
through with bribery or other patent forms of corruption.340 The salience of
the capture metaphor, and its particular resonance in the American legal
mind, likely overstates the extent to which private interests systematically
discourage agencies from pursuing the public interest. The benefits of using
hard-look review to eliminate capture may thus be smaller than are com-
monly assumed. At the same time, expanding the scope of judicial review in
a quest to prevent capture will, on balance, raise the costs of agency action
and entrench the status quo. That outcome is broadly congenial to the very
business interests that, in the capture narrative, are supposed to have the
whip hand over agencies.
Fifth, hard-look review can discourage capture only to the extent cap-
ture-tainted agency action is a product of an agency’s discretionary choices.
But capture is a complex phenomenon and may be the product of organiza-
tional dynamics at work outside the agency.341 Interest-group pressures buf-
fet Congress, for example, when it crafts the substantive rules that govern
agency action, the procedural rules that constrain that action, and the ap-
propriations laws that shape that action. What looks like agency capture may
arise not because the agency has any particular affinity for well-organized
339 . See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 463
U.S. 29, 46–51 (1983).
340 . See CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY 3 (4th ed. 2004).
341 . See Merrill, supra note 35, at 1069.
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interest groups, but because it faithfully administers the law under tight re-
source constraints. Hard-look review can do nothing to prevent that sort of
capture; to the contrary, by increasing the cost of agency action, it may exac-
erbate it. Alternatively, the White House may order an otherwise public-
regarding agency to act in a manner that curries favor with narrow interests.
The D.C. Circuit has held that an agency does not act arbitrarily when it ad-
heres to an executive order mandating a particular course of conduct,342 and
while that decision is likely wrong,343 it exemplifies the challenges of using
hard-look review to address capture emanating from the White House. In-
deed, federal judges are themselves the products of a political process in
which well-organized groups may wield disproportionate influence. To the
extent that judges are selected because their partisan orientation and judicial
outlook align with the interests of those groups, they may facilitate capture,
not the reverse.344
III. STOP FETISHIZING PROCEDURE
It has become the central dogma of administrative law: strict procedural
rules are both essential to agency legitimacy and necessary to guarantee pub-
lic accountability. That dogma is false. Proceduralism has a complex, contin-
gent, and often ambiguous connection to legitimacy and capture. Many well-
intentioned efforts to promote good governance can—and do—drain agen-
cies of their legitimacy, impair their responsiveness to the public, and expose
them to capture. Instead of defending proceduralism at a high level of ab-
straction, lawyers should develop a more granular perspective on the effects
that particular procedures have on the task of governance. The reality is usu-
ally messier than the rhetoric suggests.
In the meantime, the endless hand-wringing over agency legitimacy and
accountability breeds contempt for governance. Instead of the instruments
of public aspirations, agencies become the bastard stepchildren of a damaged
constitutional system, rife with corruption and inside dealing. That dyspep-
tic vision aligns neatly with suspicion of the state; it is, however, difficult to
harmonize with a progressive belief in the promise of government to achieve
collective goals. We should—indeed, we must—revive a strain of thinking
that connects the legitimacy of the administrative state to its ability to satisfy
public aspirations: to enable a fairer distribution of wealth and political pow-
342 . See Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that because an
agency was “[b]ound” by and not free to “disregard” an executive order, it did not act arbitrari-
ly in refusing to consider certain comments that “simply did not address any factor relevant to
implementing the Executive Order”).
343 . See Nicholas Bagley, Sherley You’re Joking, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
(Mar. 22, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/sherley-youre-joking/ [https://perma.cc/64EV-FT4P].
344 . See Elhauge, supra note 291, at 34 (“The litigation process cannot be treated as exog-
enous to interest group theory because that process is also subject to forms of interest group
influence that would be exacerbated if judicial review became more intrusive.”).
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er; to protect us from the predations of private corporations; and to mini-
mize risks to our health, financial security, and livelihoods.
In the meantime, minimalism should be the watchword. New proce-
dures should be greeted with suspicion; old procedures should be revisited,
with an eye to cutting them back or eliminating them altogether. Adminis-
trative law could achieve more by doing less.
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